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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis concentrates on China’s industrial plan, “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025). 
The plan has a dual instrumental function, namely, upgrading China’s industrial system and 
contributing to achieving China’s dream of great rejuvenation. China has developed from a 
low-income economy into a middle-income one owing to its pragmatic reforms since the end 
of the 1970s. However, due to the environmental problems and social disparity caused by the 
traditional development model, China has the risk of failing during its transformation into a 
high-income country and dropping in the middle-income trap (MIT). On the other hand, along 
with economic growth, China has shifted its low-key foreign policy to a proactive one and 
launched proposals for Asian security and world order. In this sense, China may encounter 
competition with the existing hegemony, the U.S., and drop into the Thucydides Trap (TT).  
With the hypotheses of falling into two traps, this research has used the mixed methods of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
In the quantitative approach, we have established two links by connecting the dual function of 
MIC2025 with two traps by using independent, dependent, mediating, and moderating variables 
for the hypotheses. In the first link, we have found that, although China has established a 
specific technological base, China still stands far away from the technological frontier. Thus, it 
is not easy for China to escape the MIT. In the second link, we have found that China’s position 
in the world order does not threaten America’s dominant position. However, China’s proposals 
for Asian security and the world may bring itself into a competition with the U.S. and fall into 
the TT.  
In the qualitative approach, we have done two semi-structured interviews, according to which 
China can escape the traps. However, the possibility of falling into two traps cannot be 
overlooked.  
Keywords: China; “Made in China 2025”; technological innovation; development strategy; 
middle-income trap; Thucydides Trap.  
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RESUMO  
A presente tese concentra-se num plano industrial da China, “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025). 
O plano tem uma função instrumental dupla, ou seja, atualizar o sistema industrial por inovação 
tecnológica e contribuir para alcançar o sonho da China de um grande rejuvenescimento. Assim, 
a dissertação é analisar se a China pode reformar a ordem mundial por inovação tecnológica. 
Atualmente, a China entrou num período crítico de transição da economia de renda média para 
a de renda alta. Considerando que a China está a enfrentar problemas ambientais cada vez mais 
graves e problemas sociais a nível da disparidade, a China corre o risco de não se conseguir 
transformar, sendo apanhada na middle-income trap (MIT). 
Por outro lado, como no rápido crescimento económico, a China gradualmente mudou o seu 
perfil “low-key” iniciado no período Deng Xiaoping para uma postura mais proativa na política 
global, uma diplomacia de país principal, que é entendida como diplomacia dos grandes poderes. 
A diplomacia serve para ajudar a China a realizar o sonho de modernização e construir uma 
comunidade com um futuro compartilhado para a humanidade. Sob uma política externa 
proativa, a ascensão da China provavelmente cairá na Thucydides Trap (TT), ou seja, encontrará 
concorrência com a hegemonia existente, os EUA, o que irá trazer o mundo à instabilidade. 
Combinando as funções do MIC2025 e os riscos da China cair em duas armadilhas, propusemos 
duas hipóteses: o MIC2025 pode ajudar a China a escapar da MIT e manter um 
desenvolvimento sustentável; e a China, com a força aumentada pelo plano industrial, escapará 
da TT e contribuirá para melhorar a ordem mundial multilateral. 
Considerando vários fatores que afetarão a eficácia das funções do MIC2025, elaborámos 
adicionalmente três proposições para as respectivas hipóteses. 
Especificamente, para a primeira hipótese, as proposições são: o MIC2025 tem a função 
instrumental de promover o desenvolvimento por inovação tecnológica; A China possui 
condições pré-existentes para executar o MIC2025; O domínio das economias avançadas em 
inovação deixará espaço limitado para a China executar o plano. 
Para a segunda hipótese, as proposições são: o MIC2025 tem a função instrumental de aumentar 
a força da China; As propostas da China para o mundo não levarão a China à TT, mas 
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contribuirão para melhorar a ordem mundial multilateral; A China tem condições limitadas para 
reformar a ordem mundial, que é estabelecida e mantida pelos EUA e seus aliados. 
Com várias hipóteses e proposições, projetámos a pesquisa de uma perspectiva pragmática, o 
que nos pode permitir fazer escolhas livremente e tirar proveito de diferentes abordagens para 
alcançar o objetivo.  
Sob esta perspectiva, usámos métodos mistos sequenciais explicativos, que envolvem uma 
recolha de dados quantitativos primeiro e depois explicam os resultados quantitativos com os 
dados qualitativos. 
Na parte quantitativa, primeiramente construímos relações entre as teorias de inovação 
tecnológica, desenvolvimento e poder, que mais tarde serão usadas como orientação para 
recolher e analisar os dados quantitativos. 
Em seguida, recolhemos os dados quantitativos com a organização das hipóteses e as suas 
proposições usando variáveis. As variáveis foram escolhidas com base no motivo pragmático, 
o que nos pode fornecer uma estrutura precisa para direcionar o processo de recolha de dados. 
Selecionámos quatro tipos de variáveis para construir a estrutura, ou seja, variáveis 
independentes, dependentes, mediadoras e moderadoras. 
As variáveis independentes são variáveis preditoras que podem causar os resultados, que são 
variáveis dependentes. As duas variáveis constituem uma estrutura de causa e efeito. Na 
estrutura, as mediadoras afetarão as dependentes em conjunto com as independentes; enquanto 
que as moderadoras, com a natureza de variáveis independentes, afetarão a direção e a força da 
relação entre as independentes e dependentes. 
Com base nas características das variáveis e nas hipóteses, elaborámos duas ligações causais. 
Especificamente, na Ligação 1, a primeira proposição da função instrumental do MIC2025 em 
desenvolvimento serve como a variável independente (VI), que causará ou influenciará o 
resultado de escapar da MIT, que é considerada a variável dependente (VD). Além disso, a 
segunda proposição das condições preexistentes da China para executar o MIC2025 é a variável 
mediadora (VM1), afetando positivamente a ligação de causalidade; a terceira proposição de 
domínio da inovação das economias avançadas é a variável moderadora (VM2), influenciando 
negativamente a direção da ligação. 
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Na Ligação 2, a primeira proposição da função instrumental do plano no poder como VI gerará 
o efeito de VD de ajudar a China a escapar da TT. Além disso, a segunda proposição das 
propostas da China para o mundo, servindo como VM1, exercerá um efeito positivo sobre a 
ligação. Por outro lado, a terceira proposição da ordem mundial liberal como VM2 terá um 
impacto adverso. 
Com relação às abordagens de pesquisa, para a Ligação 1, foram utilizadas principalmente as 
abordagens de análise de conteúdo de materiais em primeira mão e análise secundária de 
estatísticas oficiais. Na abordagem da análise de conteúdo, os documentos e textos foram 
recolhidos de livros editados pelo governo chinês, o site do governo chinês e os sites da 
imprensa principal chinesa (People’s Daily, Xinhua, China Daily), enquanto na abordagem da 
análise secundária das estatísticas oficiais, as estatísticas foram recolhidas no site dos 
departamentos do governo chinês e da imprensa principal chinesa. 
Para a Ligação 2, apesar das duas abordagens usadas na primeira, também usámos os estudos 
comparativos entre a atual China e o Japão na década de 1980 para analisar a posição da China 
na ordem mundial. 
Após a recolha dos dados, examinamos as relações teóricas que estabelecemos e obtivemos 
resultados quantitativos. 
Na primeira ligação, descobrimos que o MIC2025 oferece uma trajetória orientada à inovação 
para o futuro desenvolvimento da China. A China construiu uma base tecnológica específica 
por meio de políticas contínuas de ciência e tecnologia, inovação indígena, investmento interno 
e investimento externo, que podem ajudar a China a executar o MIC2025. No entanto, a China 
ainda se mantém distante da fronteira tecnológica, dominada pelas economias ocidentais. Além 
disso, a proteção de propriedade intelectual (PI) da China ainda é fraca; As empresas privadas 
da China, que são mais eficientes em comparação com as estatais, foram reprimidas. Por fim, 
o risco de queda na MIT aumentou, não apenas devido aos problemas existentes em proteção 
ambiental e disparidade social, mas também ao surgimento do desemprego tecnológico e à 
intensificação da lacuna de desenvolvimento causada pelo MIC2025. Nesse sentido, é difícil 
para a China escapar da MIT e manter o desenvolvimento sustentável. 
Na segunda ligação, descobrimos que o MIC2025 serve como um passo estratégico para realizar 
o sonho da China de grande rejuvenescimento. Com o crescente poder económico, militar e 
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científico, a China propôs as suas soluções para a Ásia e o desenvolvimento mundial. Para a 
Ásia, trata-se do novo conceito de segurança asiática da China, que enfatiza a participação de 
todos os países asiáticos na manutenção da segurança. No entanto, isso dificilmente pode ser 
alcançado, pois nesta região, os EUA mantiveram preeminência militar e desenvolveram 
aliados estratégicos com vários países asiáticos. Para o mundo, a noção da China de uma 
comunidade de um futuro compartilhado para a humanidade é representada economicamente 
pela Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Embora as rotas da BRI se espalhem amplamente, a China 
considera principalmente os países e regiões vizinhos com os quais pretende cooperar. Assim, 
a BRI demonstra as características do regionalismo e do bilateralismo. Em relação à posição da 
China na ordem mundial, comparamos o Japão e a China com os aspectos da sua posição na 
ordem e a sua relação com os EUA. Descobrimos que, na ordem mundial, a posição da China 
não representa ameaças à posição de liderança da América. Além disso, os dois países 
desenvolveram relações económicas interconectadas. Os dois elementos podem ajudar a China 
a escapar dos conflitos com os EUA. No entanto, a China tende a mudar seu status quo e torna-
se desafiadora da ordem. Nesse sentido, a China e os EUA podem cair na TT sobre questões de 
segurança na Ásia. 
Com os resultados quantitativos, escolhemos dois entrevistados (um funcionário da Embaixada 
da China em Portugal e uma repórter da China Daily) familiarizados com as questões 
tecnológicas da China e interessados na ascensão da China usando entrevistas semiestruturadas. 
Para os dados qualitativos, usámos análise crítica do discurso. Descobrimos que os 
entrevistados mantêm uma atitude realista de que a China atualizará o sistema industrial e obterá 
mais poder económico; enquanto para o futuro da ascensão da China, os entrevistados têm uma 
perspectiva liberal de que a China pode realizar uma ascensão pacífica devido à 
interdependência económica no mundo. Em suma, os dois pensam que a China pode escapar da 
MIT e da TT. 
Por fim, concluímos que o MIC2025 é crucial para a China alcançar os países desenvolvidos. 
A China não pode utilizar o plano para alcançar o desenvolvimento sustentável sem considerar 
a proteção ambiental, a justiça social, a proteção de PI e a motivação dos empreendedores. Por 
outro lado, no processo de alcançar o mesmo, a China pode escapar intencionalmente da TT e 
concentrar-se no desenvolvimento económico. No entanto, na Ásia, tendo em com consideração 
a segurança nacional, a China não pode evitar conflitos com os EUA para defender seus 
interesses nacionais.  
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INTRODUCTION 
China, known as the biggest developing country, has developed from a low-income economy 
into a middle-income one, due to its pragmatic reforms since the end of the 1970s (Cai, 2012). 
At present, China has entered a critical period of turning from a middle-income economy into 
a high-income one (Aoki, 2011; Cai, 2012). However, China has been facing increasingly 
severe environmental problems and social problems regarding disparity in income distribution. 
Thus, China is at risk of failing and being trapped in the middle-income trap (MIT) (Cai, 2012; 
Gill et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, along with rapid economic growth, China has gradually changed its “low-
key” profile, which started in the Deng Xiaoping period (Yan & Gong, 2018), into a more 
proactive posture in global politics (Zhang, 2010). Under the leadership of Xi Jinping in 2012, 
China put forward a “major country” diplomacy (Daguo waijiao) (People.cn, 2017) that is 
defined as “Great power diplomacy” by various scholars worldwide (Dotson, 2019; Miller, 
2013; Takahashi, 2017; Zhang, Ye, Wang, Galli & Budeanu, 2018). This diplomacy is meant 
to help China fulfill China Dream of modernization and build up a community with a shared 
future for humankind (Ibid.). Under the proactive foreign policy, China’s further rise will 
probably make it fall into the Thucydides Trap (TT), namely facing competition with the 
existing hegemony, the U.S., in a process of growing instability in world economics and politics 
(Allison, 2015; Lee, 2019). 
Under this background, in 2015, the Chinese government launched an industrial plan called 
“Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) (China State Council - CSC, 2015). The plan aims at 
upgrading China’s industrial system and building up industries in ten vital sectors, with a 
strategic aim of becoming less dependent on some key sectors and further fulfilling China 
Dream of modernization (Ibid.). Thus, this research is developed under the topic of “‘Made in 
China 2025’: China’s development strategy through technological innovation.” 
RESEARCH RELEVANCE, RESEARCH QUESTION, AND OBJECTIVES 
The research evolves under the discipline of the political economy of international relations 
(IR). Specifically, in IR, the state is the main actor. From a realist perspective (Carr, 1946/1981; 
Knorr, 1975; Morgenthau, 1985; Waltz, 1959), the political order is characterized by anarchy. 
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In the anarchy, without an organized power, there exists no automatic harmony (Waltz, 1959). 
Thereby, the states are likely to face a security dilemma, which forces them to obtain more 
power to achieve their goals, of which the most important one is security (Carr, 1946/1981; 
Morgenthau, 1985; Waltz, 1959). 
Under the discipline of political economy, the states usually take measures of “reducing the 
home state’s dependence on others” (Gill & Law, 1988, p. 27) to increase the security. In other 
words, complete self-sufficiency is ideal for a state’s economic security (Gill & Law, 1988). In 
practical terms, the state will make industrial policies to build up its strategic industries, which 
concern “national security and self-sufficiency in vital sectors” (Ibid., p. 28). 
MIC2025 is China’s strategic industrial policy. Since 2015, it has triggered quite different 
reactions inside and outside of China.  
Chinese scholars generally hold a positive attitude towards the plan and consider it imperative 
for China’s sustainable development. It is destined to contribute directly to the implementation 
of the manufacturing transformation and upgrade (Xiang, 2015) to further equip China with 
core technologies (Zhang, 2016) in the areas of digitalization, networking, and intelligence. 
Finally, it will hasten the fulfillment of China’s dream “of moving into the high-income club” 
(Wei, Xie & Zhang, 2017, p. 68) through technological innovation (Liu, Liu & Zhang, 2018). 
Thus, for them, MIC2025 acts as the new engine of China’s development, while coupled with 
challenges in the areas of manufacturing capabilities, research and development, and human 
capital (Li, 2017). 
In contrast, non-Chinese scholars have quite different attitudes: a few scholars (Jung, 2016) 
maintain a reserved attitude toward the plan, while the rest is dominated by vigilance (Heilmann, 
2016). These phenomena are mainly caused by the hypothesis that China’s transformation into 
a manufacturing superpower will result in steep challenges for the existing manufacturing 
powers (Institute for Security & Development Policy - ISDP, 2018) due to “perceived 
intellectual property (IP) abuses, and discrimination against foreign companies” (ISDP, 2018, 
p. 1). Particularly the United States, as the leading technological power, will encounter threats 
from the rise of China (Deutch, 2018) and “an unwelcome but unavoidable contest” (Lewis, 
2018, p. 7) with China for the leading role in the international order (Lewis, 2018). This 
unavoidable contest is called TT, a term that Graham Allision (2015) coined to indicate the 
instability in U.S.-China relations led by the structural change that China’s rising caused.  
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Besides these two kinds of views, Malkin (2018) has an entirely different perspective. Malkin 
states that China’s approach to innovation can be regarded as “a global trade governance issue” 
to test the “balance between binding rules and policy space since the establishment of the WTO 
(World Trade Organization)” through integrating China into a “rules-based global trading order” 
(p. 21). 
After reviewing the literature, one can find that both of these perspectives have concentrated 
on just one of the possible effects - national or international - of the plan, and lack 
comprehensive consideration. 
Besides, we have also found that the existing theories of technological innovation and 
development have been born in a capitalist background and have not provided the experiences 
of a non-capitalist developing country. Therefore, we will conduct original work and focus on 
the case of China. We will accurately testify if the mechanism of technological innovation can 
still be useful for China in the aspect of promoting its development and accelerating its rise in 
international politics. 
Therefore, our research will contribute comprehensive and original perspectives to the analysis 
of the plan dealing with prospective Chinese development and China’s rise in the world order. 
The research will start with the question: 
➢ Is MIC2025 an instrument for China’s development strategy to enhance its position in the 
world order? 
To answer the research question, we propose the general objective: 
➢ To analyze if China can reform the actual world order through technological innovation 
And five specific ones: 
⚫ To explore the strategic importance of MIC2025 
⚫ To examine China’s pre-existing conditions for performing MIC2025 
⚫ To inspect China’s limitations for performing MIC2025 
⚫ To analyze China’s position in the current world order 
⚫ To evaluate China’s proposals for the world order 
 4 
 
HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND DATA COLLECTION 
Concerning the research question, there are two directions to elaborate on our hypotheses. The 
first one is the instrumental function of MIC2025 in promoting China’s development, and the 
other is in helping China rise in the world order.   
Combining the first direction and China’s risk of falling into the MIT, the first hypothesis is 
proposed as follows: 
H1: MIC2025 can help China escape the MIT and maintain sustainable development. 
It needs to be noted that various factors and constraints will affect the effectiveness of the plan 
in exerting its instrumental function of development. Naturally, regarding this hypothesis, we 
have further elaborated three propositions: 
P1: MIC2025 has the instrumental function of promoting development by technological 
innovation. 
P2: China has pre-existing conditions to perform MIC2025. 
P3: Advanced economies’ dominance in innovation will leave limited space for China to carry 
out the plan. 
Combining the second direction and China’s risk of falling into the TT, the second hypothesis 
is brought forth: 
H2: China, with the strength enhanced by the industrial plan, will escape the TT and contribute 
to the reinforcement of a multilateral world order. 
With similar logic, there are factors and constraints that will affect the plan’s effectiveness in 
exerting its instrumental function of power. Thus, for the second hypothesis, we have also 
elaborated three propositions: 
P1: MIC2025 has the instrumental function of increasing China’s strength. 
P2: China’s proposals for the world will not lead China to the TT, but instead will lead the 
country to enhance multilateral world order. 
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P3: China has limited conditions to reform the world order, which is established and maintained 
by the U.S. and its allies. 
To start our research design, we should first choose an appropriate philosophical view that is 
composed of “a set of beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990, cit., Creswell, 2014, p. 6) and can 
direct us to the research purpose. 
Having considered the hypotheses and related propositions, we chose the pragmatism, a world 
view that “is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality” (Creswell, 2014, p. 
11) and will permit us to freely make choices (Creswell, 2014) and take advantages of different 
approaches to realize the aim. 
From a pragmatic perspective, the investigation will be concentrated on the problem and the 
results in the mixed context concerning political, economic, social, and other factors (Ibid.). 
Naturally, under the background of complex international relations, to achieve our research 
purpose, we decided to design our research by using the mixed methods constituted of the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative approach, which provide us with “a more complete 
understanding of a research problem than either approach alone” (Ibid., p. 4), and give us access 
to both quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell, 2014). 
In our research, therefore, the explanatory sequential mixed methods design has been used, in 
which it involves the collection of quantitative data first and then explains the quantitative 
results “in more detail” (Creswell, 2014, p. 224) with the qualitative data. 
First of all, we have constructed relations among the theories of technological innovation, 
development, and power, which will later be used as the direction for us to collect and analyze 
the quantitative data. 
Then, we start collecting the quantitative data with the organization of the hypotheses and their 
propositions by using variables, the common elements in quantitative approach, which refers to 
“a characteristic or attribute of an individual or an organization that can be measured or 
observed and that varies among the people or organization being studied” (Creswell, 2014, p. 
52). 
The variables have been chosen in our study based on the pragmatic motive, considering its 
attribute of dividing elements of “a given situation” (Ibid.) into “at least two mutually exclusive 
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categories” (Ibid.), providing us with the precise structure to direct the process of data 
collections. 
In constructing the structure, we principally selected four types of variables: independent 
variables, dependent variables, mediating variables, and moderating variables.  
The independent variables, also named “treatment, manipulated, antecedent or predictor 
variables” (Ibid.) can “cause, influence, or affect” (Ibid.) the outcomes, which are defined as 
dependent variables (Creswell, 2014). 
With independent variables and dependent variables, a cause-and-effect structure is set up 
(Ibid.), in which there exist other variables that exert impacts on the causal link (Ibid.), like 
mediating variables and moderating variables.  
The mediating variables, according to Creswell (2014), are in the middle of the causal link and 
“mediate the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable” (p. 52). The 
moderating variables are different, as they belong to “independent variables that affect the 
direction and the strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables” 
(Thompson, 2006, cit., Creswell, 2014, p. 53). In other words, the dependent variables will 
depend on the “joint impact” (Creswell, 2014, p. 53) determined by both the independent and 
mediating variables (Creswell, 2014).  
Based on the characteristics of the variables and the hypotheses, thus, we have elaborated two 
causal links. 
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Figure 1 Link 1 
Source: Made by the author 
 
Figure 2 Link 2 
Source: Made by the author  
Specifically, in Link 1 (see Figure 1), the first proposition of instrumental function of MIC2025 
in development serves as the independent variable (IV) that will cause or influence the outcome 
of escaping the MIT, which is regarded as the dependent variable (DV). Moreover, the second 
proposition of China’s pre-existing conditions to perform MIC2025 is the mediating variable 
(MV1) positively affecting the causal link; the third proposition of innovation dominance of 
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advanced economies is the moderating variable (MV2) negatively influencing the direction of 
the causal link. 
In Link 2 (see Figure 2), the first proposition of the instrumental function of the plan in power 
as IV will generate the effect of DV of helping China escape the TT. Also, the second 
proposition of China’s proposals for the world, serving as MV1, will exert a positive effect over 
the causal link. Conversely, the third proposition of the actual liberal world order, as MV2, will 
have adverse effects on the link. 
With relation to the research approaches, for the first causal link, we mainly used the approaches 
of content analysis of first-hand materials and secondary analysis of official statistics (Bryman, 
2012). In the approach of content analysis, the documents and texts were collected from books 
edited by the Chinese government, the websites of the Chinese government, and the websites 
of the principal Chinese media (China Daily, People’s Daily, Xinhua). In the approach of 
secondary analysis of official statistics, the statistics were collected from the websites of 
Chinese government departments and the principal Chinese media. 
For the second causal link, despite the two approaches used in the first link, we also used one 
of the comparative studies between the current China and Japan in the 1980s to analyze China’s 
position in the world order.  
After collecting the data, we examined the theoretical relations that we have established and 
obtained a quantitative result, which can inform “the types of participants to be purposefully 
selected” (Creswell, 2014, p. 224) for our following qualitative study.  
The qualitative study was conducted with the instrument of semi-structured interviews; the 
questions served as “an interview guide” (Bryman, 2012, p. 471), leaving for the interviewee 
“a great of leeway in how to reply” (Ibid.). 
The interview was designed with a list of interviewees, including a Chinese official (from 
China’s Embassy in Portugal), a Chinese reporter (from China Daily), Chinese company 
representatives (from Huawei and ZTE), and foreign representatives (from American and 
Japanese Embassy in Portugal).  
After having contacted the planned interviewees, both the Chinese company representatives 
and foreign representatives did not accept the invitation.  
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Thereby, our interviewees are made up of one Chinese official and one Chinese reporter. Both 
the interviewees are familiar with Chinese technological issues and interested in China’s rise in 
global politics. The interview with the Chinese official was a face-to-face one, while the one 
with the reporter was finished by telephone due to the distance.  
In the final phase, we have used critical discourse analysis, which is an inductive approach 
(Bryman, 2012) to analyze the qualitative data collected from the interviews responding to the 
quantitative results.  
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PART ONE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the research question, we are generally considering two main perspectives: one 
discusses how technological innovation promotes development, and the other discusses how 
technological innovation affects the formation of political power and further the world order.  
Thus, the core theories in our research are technological innovation, development, and power. 
Naturally, the structure will be built up in the aspect of exploring relations among these theories.  
However, there is no direct literature that analyzes the relations. Through a thorough 
consultation and organization of relevant literature, we have constructed connections among 
them.  
First of all, technological innovation is a complex economic phenomenon because of its nature 
of creative destruction and knowledge, various determinants and dynamics, and different actors 
of entrepreneurs and state, and by combining the nature of development, technological 
innovation can serve as an effective instrument in promoting development nationally or 
internationally; furthermore, it can also be transformed into the various forms of political power 
and then used by the countries to enhance their positions, which deeply affects the formation of 
world order. 
Therefore, our theoretical background will be built up in three sections of technological 
innovation, technological innovation and development, and technological innovation and power.   
1. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION  
1.1.NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
In the literature, there is no specific definition of technological innovation as a whole, but there 
is distinct research on the meaning of technology and innovation.  
First of all, technology is a form of knowledge (Dosi, 1984; Hall, 1994; Smith, 1996). 
According to Smith (1996), knowledge, in essence, is a special commodity with the apparent 
characteristics of public goods. With the nature of public goods, technological knowledge is 
independent in the context of transmission costs that can be neglected (Smith, 1996). This 
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feature is applied for the technological knowledge, whether in the practical form “related to 
concreate problems and devices” (Dosi, 1984, pp. 13-14) or in the theoretical form reflected in 
“know-how, methods, procedures, experience of successes and failure and also, of course, 
physical devices and equipment” (Ibid.). 
The increasing of the stock of technological knowledge, naturally, generates the “effects of 
expanding the knowledge base” (Hall, 1994, p. 18), presented in the concrete form of technical 
change (Hall, 1994), which always leads to the economic situation of “higher productivity, the 
production of new goods or the improvement of existing ones” (Ibid., p. 18).  
However, in technological innovation, the knowledge change is not gentle but violent, which is 
principally influenced by the nature of innovation of “creative destruction” (Elster, 1983; 
McCraw, 2007; Schumpeter, 1985). 
Concerning the exploration of the nature of innovation, the most outstanding scholar is 
Schumpeter (Elster, 1983; McCraw, 2007). According to Schumpeter (1934), innovation is 
regarded as the new combinations of production means via creative destruction, serving as the 
engine of capitalist development (Ibid.)  To achieve innovations, there are generally five 
channels, namely,  
the introduction of a new good; the introduction of a new method of 
production; the opening of a new market; the conquest of a new source of 
supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods; the carrying out of a 
new organization of any industry. (Schumpeter, 1934, cit., Elster, 1983, p. 
116) 
The process of innovation, therefore, determines the fact that the technological innovation is an 
original process of generating new technologies by means of creative destruction of the existing 
ones (Elster, 1983), and it is quite different from the technological imitation, which highly 
depends on the technology transfer and the host country’s absorptive capacity (Madsen, Islam 
& Ang, 2010). Moreover, technological imitation usually happens in backward countries 
lacking the technological base to make innovation (Ibid.). 
1.2.DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
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Based on the nature of technological innovation, it can be a complex phenomenon. The process 
is affected by various determinants, generally of two categories: endogenous and exogenous.  
From the endogenous perspective, technological innovation is viewed as a learning process 
(Rosenberg, 1985). The viewpoint can be traced back to the classical period, in which Adam 
Smith (1976) found out that technical progress was mainly made by three types of learning 
processes: learning by using by specific workers, learning by doing through specialization in 
machine production, and formal or scientific learning (von Tunzelmann, 1995).  
The aspect of the learning process cannot wholly explain the complexity of technological 
innovation. Based on the study of various scholars (Dosi, 1984; Hall, 1994; Mowery & 
Rosenberg, 1985), we have found that the exogenous determinants have two types, the 
technical-push with the focus on the function of science, and the demand-pull concentrated on 
the force of the market.  
The technical-push treats science as an independent area to drive technology forward (Dosi, 
1984; Hall, 1994). The view was added by von Tunzelmann (1995), with reference to Kuznets 
(1973, 1974), that “the emergence of modern science as the basis of advancing technology – a 
breakthrough in the evolution of science (…) produced a potential for technology far greater 
than existed previously” (p. 74). 
However, Hall (1994) thought that technical-push is a typical linear model of science-
technology-production without consideration of external marketing factors. Thus, the demand-
pull emerged as a remedied theory.  
Mowery and Rosenberg (1985) held that the market is “the causal prime mover” (p. 204) for 
technical progress. Specifically, the productive units recognize the market needs and make 
efforts to improve their technological activities to fulfill those needs (Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1985).  
With technological advancement and the emergence of sophisticated technologies, both the 
endogenous and the exogenous determinants encounter limitations. Thus, research and 
development (R&D), driven by the combined effects of the learning process and market 
motivations, has gained fame and popularity in academia (Belcher, Hassard & Procter, 1996). 
1.3.DYNAMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
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As with various other determinants, technological innovation evolves along with its logic and 
dynamics, which have been identified and studied in the literature (Dosi, 1984; Hall, 1994; 
Rosenberg, 1985).  
First of all, technical change does not happen at random but in “a deep structure” (Hall, 1994, 
p. 28) determined by the existing technologies. This structure was defined as a technical 
paradigm by Dosi (1984) and Hall (1994).  
The notion of the paradigm was first used in the history of science (Kuhn, 1970, cit., Hall, 1994), 
“thought of as a way of looking at the world (or part of it) which enables problems to be defined 
and research to be given pattern and structure” (p. 28). 
Then, Dosi (1984) found a similar logic of paradigm in technical change, in which the techno-
economic problems are resolved based on selected principles of the existing science and 
“specific rules aimed at acquiring new knowledge” (Hall, 1994, p. 29). 
Within the technical paradigm, there always exists a momentum or direction (Dosi, 1984); that 
is to say, “once a path has been selected and established, it shows a momentum of its own” 
(Ibid., p. 17). 
This momentum has been further named by Dosi (1984) as a technological trajectory; that is, 
“a normal problem-solving activity determined by a paradigm” (p. 17), can promote 
technological innovation by its driving force. But Hall (1994) pointed out that the trajectory can 
also turn into technological imperative, especially when it encounters “bottlenecks in connected 
processes and obvious weak spots in products” (Rosenberg, 1969, cit., Hall, 1994, p. 29). 
In this condition, according to Dosi (1984), it is not easy to switch to an alternative one, and the 
only way to change paradigm is to “start (almost) from the beginning in the problem-solving 
activity” (p. 18). 
Therefore, both the perspective of paradigm and trajectory concern the inner logic of technical 
progress. Besides the inner logic, technical diffusion is another dynamic and plays a role in 
promoting technical progress (Landau & Rosenberg, 1992; Rosenberg, 1985). The technical 
diffusion is motivated by the nature of goods of technology to realize its commercialization, or 
its economic values (Ibid.). 
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According to Rosenberg (1985), new technologies are invented in creating the first data of 
technological feasibility. Also, the diffusion of new technologies is a process of identifying 
their economic impact. Freeman (2004) adds that the diffusion process will lead to further 
innovation yet in “heavily skewed distributions of research, inventive and innovative activities” 
(pp. 550-551) and form clusters.  
Landau and Rosenberg (1992) point out that the context of economic globalization has not only 
diversified the process of technological diffusion but also enhanced the role of the diffusion, 
especially in the form of technology transfer. 
Technology transfer can help innovating countries “gain the competitive advantage” (Landau 
& Rosenberg, 1992, p. 4) and also permit recipient countries to have the late-comer advantage 
of “the ability to industrialize through borrowing rather than independent invention” 
(Rosenberg, 1985, p. 247). 
1.4.ACTORS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
In the literature, there are generally two types of actors that dominate the process of 
technological innovation, the entrepreneurs and the state.  
The entrepreneurs are considered as the main protagonists in the process of innovation 
(McCraw, 2007). Defined as the “new men” by Schumpeter (1983), the entrepreneurs, 
motivated by profit, act as the “pivot on which everything turns” (cit., McCraw, 2007, p. 7) in 
the enterprises in whatever form or with whatever nature. 
According to McCraw (2007), innovation serves as the motivation to gain higher profit for the 
entrepreneurs. Thus, there are two choices: that of the innovators who, to preserve high profit 
as long as possible, will utilize various mechanisms of protection, development, or publicity, 
specifically “through patents, further innovation, secret processes, and advertising” (p. 255); 
the non-innovators, on the other hand, will quickly react and try to imitate the innovation 
(McCraw, 2007).  
However, Nelson and Wright (1992) thought that the Schumpeterian innovation mechanism 
centered on the competition was partial and limited without the consideration of the public side 
of technology. Thus, he pointed out, the process of innovation could be implemented by the 
mechanisms through which “new technical information is shared” (p. 58) and which “can be 
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used to pursue it cooperatively” (Ibid.) by various social institutions. Moreover, Nelson and 
Wright (1992) have emphasized the scientific contribution made by universities. 
Compared with other social institutions, the firm, according to Hall (1994), can play a more 
active role in the realization of innovation, because as the “decision-making unit engaged in 
production” (p. 167), it can introduce new technologies into production in which “much new 
technology is developed in the pursuit of product and process innovation” (Ibid.). Moreover, it 
is usually “the quantity and timing of R&D undertaken within a firm” (Ibid.) that determine the 
speed of generating new technologies (Hall, 1994).  
However, no matter how effective the mechanisms made by entrepreneurs or firms may be, 
they are still mainly affected by the national innovation policies (Fransman, 1994; Freeman, 
2004; Malerba, 1992). 
According to Malerba (1992), regarding the function of technological innovation, the public 
policy contributes as a principal force to “the organization of innovative activities and the 
commercialization of new technologies” (p. 264) through “mission-oriented programs” (p. 265), 
which can accumulate the forces from various institutions of “firms, research organizations, 
and universities” (p. 267) to focus on specific and essential technology.  
Also, it is essential to note that public policies are different in different countries (Fransman, 
1994; Malerba, 1992). Different from the bottom-up policies of European countries (Malerba, 
1992), which emphasize “the establishment of technical standards, formation of human capital, 
the provision of technical information, and the diffusion of new technologies” (Malerba, 1992, 
p. 275), Japanese policies exert a stronger influence in the form of top-down or upstream 
(Fransman, 1994), reflected in the dominant occupation in R&D investment with a rate of nearly 
90 percent by the government (Fransman, 1994). 
2. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Technological innovation has always served as a driving force for development, which has been 
thoroughly discussed in the literature (Dosi, 1984; Folgieri, 2016; Lundvall, 2016; Schumpeter, 
1985; von Tunzelmann, 1995). However, before exploring the connections between them, it is 
vital to know the nature of development.  
2.1.NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT 
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Development is also a complicated issue in international politics. In the area of social science, 
there has been a variety of understandings about it with different emphases in its evolution for 
many years (Fuentes, 1993; Gilpin, 1987; Gustance & Hillier, 1998; Herath, 2009; Hosseini, 
2003; Lin & Rosenblatt, 2012; Thomas, 2006; United Nations Development Program - UNDP, 
2015). 
The conventional development theory is born in Europe (Herath, 2009; Hosseini, 2003). It 
mainly concentrates on economic growth measured by the “positive change in real GDP (gross 
domestic product)” (Hosseini, 2010, p. 93), and on economic progress to accomplish “the 
growth of capitalism” (Herath, 2009, p. 1450), by resolving the problems of “urbanization, 
poverty and unemployment” (Ibid.).  
However, in the “twentieth-century divergence” (Lin & Rosenblatt, 2012, p. 172) caused by 
industrialization, there emerged a division of developed and under-developed countries, with a 
more obvious gap after WWII (Herath, 2009; Hosseini, 2003; Lin & Rosenblatt, 2012).  
Under this background, in what concerns the “Third World development” (Herath, 2009, p. 
1452), a modernization paradigm has been proposed, which is constituted by “a process of 
emulation of the patterns of development previously experienced by the now so-called 
developed nations” (Blomstrom & Hettne, 1984, cit., Herath, 2009, p. 1452).  
For the less developed countries (LDCs), however, the development issue is much more 
complicated than the one of growth, since it relies on the particular circumstances in society, 
politics, and economy (Hosseini, 2003). Thus, the economic development with the aim of 
“narrowing of the gap in per capita income between the rich and poor countries” (Lewis, 1944, 
cit., Hosseini, 2003, p. 93) is quite not sufficient for the LDCs (Hosseini, 2003).  
As an alternative, the development economics born for the LDCs is much more practical, and 
are designed to deal with “the root causes of poverty and backwardness” (Ibid., p. 92) and 
finally contributes to the transformation of “poor/non-industrialized economies to 
developed/industrialized ones” (Hosseini, 2003, p. 93). 
It is worth noting that in the process of transformation, the LDCs are likely to drop in the MIT 
(Gill et al., 2007). The MIT hypothesis was launched by the World Bank to indicate the risk 
that will be encountered by East Asian middle-income countries in transforming into high-
income countries (Ibid.), as they are “squeezed between the low-wage poor-country competitors 
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that dominate in mature industries and the rich-country innovators that dominate in industries 
undergoing rapid technological change” (Garrett, 2004, cit., Gill et al., 2007, p. 5).  
The countries to be caught in the trap are probably caused by their lack in “institutions, capital 
markets, track record, or critical mass of highly skilled workers” (Flaaen, Ghani & Mishra, 
2013, p. 1), or by the challenges of “distribution and social cohesion issues” (Ibid.). Besides 
these causes, the governments of these countries rarely shift from the “past successful policies” 
(Ibid.) or “exit prematurely from the industries that could have served as the basis for their 
specialization process” (Ibid.).   
Besides the conventional development theories focusing on economic progress, the literature 
evolves with the notion of human development and sustainable development (Hossieni, 2010).  
Human development is people-centered, a perspective that is enlightened by the UNDP in the 
Human Development Report (1997). In this Report, UNDP uses variables such as “life 
expectancy, educational attainment and real GDP per capita” (Herath, 2009, p. 1458) to build 
Human Development Index and Human Poverty Index to measure the development (Herath, 
2009). 
The sustainable development approach relates to development that integrates social, 
environmental, and economic factors (Thomas, 2006), relying on “using resources today 
without affecting the options for future generations” (WCED, 1987, cit., Fuentes, 1993, p. 576), 
aiming to achieve a balance between three objectives, namely, “maintenance of economic 
growth, protection of the environment and prudent use of natural resources, and social progress 
that recognizes the needs of everyone” (Custance & Hillier, 1998, p. 281).  
2.2.TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
In promoting development, technological innovation is an effective instrument in the aspect of 
economic growth, economic structure, and sustainable development, which has been found and 
continuously deepened by many scholars (Alemu, 2013; Dosi, 1984; Folgieri, 2016; Fuentes, 
1993;  Gustance & Hillier, 1998; Hall, 1994;  Lundvall, 2016; Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1989;  Schumpeter, 1985; Thomas, 2006; UNDP, 2015; von Tunzelmann, 1995).   
2.2.1. IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
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Among the elements that promote economic growth, technological innovation can serve as the 
principal driving force (Folgieri, 2016; Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989; Schumpeter, 1985; 
von Tunzelmann, 1995). 
For Schumpeter, economic growth is the result of new combinations within the process of 
creative destruction (Elster, 1983). Thus, various methods of productivity are only 
differentiated by how the combinations are constituted and by the relations between the 
combining objects (Ibid.).  
The driving dynamism of Schumpeterian innovation is not in linear but in circular flux, aiming 
to achieve the state of equilibrium: “it is a spontaneous and discontinuous change in the flow 
channels and in the disturbance of the equilibrium, which always change and move into the 
previously existing equilibrium state1” (Schumpeter, 1985, p. 47). 
Schumpeterian innovation theory, developed for a capitalist society that has an established 
industrial base, is not appropriate for non-industrialized societies. Accordingly, for the 
relatively backward societies with small domestic markets, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) proposed 
the concept of the big push (cit., Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).  
The big push occurs “if various sectors of the economy adopted increasing returns technologies 
simultaneously, they could each create income that becomes a source of demand for goods in 
other sectors, and so enlarge their markets and make industrialization profitable” (Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1943, cit., Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989, p. 1004).  
For Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), the process of simultaneous industrialization is 
mainly driven by promoting domestic demand while ignoring the function of exporting growth. 
The technological innovation contributes to economic growth mainly by increasing the 
productivity, which will necessarily generate new technologies and upgrade the existing 
machines, with a direct function of “facilitating and abridging labor” (von Tunzelmann, 1995, 
p. 39).  
 
1 Translated by the author from the original version of “é uma mudança espontânea e descontínua nos canais do 
fluxo, perturbação do equilíbrio, que altera e desloca para sempre o estado de equilíbrio previamente existente”. 
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However, in the meantime, it shall cause the anxieties of technological unemployment (Folgieri, 
2016; von Tunzelmann, 1995) by reducing the necessary working hours occupied by human 
workers (Folgieri, 2016). 
This anxiety is, nevertheless, temporary and should be analyzed in a farsighted way. Concerning 
David Ricardo (1817) and Marx (1887, 1965), von Tunzelmann (1995) explained that in the 
process of mechanization, generally, labor will be relocated by the ‘invisible hand’ and in the 
end, receive higher wages. 
2.2.2. IN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Besides economic growth, technological progress proceeds toward the structural equilibrium 
and sustained growth through adjusting the demand and supply side (Dosi, 1984; Hall, 1994), 
mainly reflected in the development of external and knowledge economy (Alemu, 2013; Hall, 
1994; Lundvall, 2016). 
For a nation, the external economy is primarily determined by the comparative advantage 
(Freeman, 2004; Gereffi, 1999). Technological innovation is precisely the factor that can 
determine “how comparative advantage changes” (Hall, 1994, p. 392). 
Specifically, technical progress will expand production possibilities and increase the production 
possibility frontier or technology frontier (Hall, 1994), which enables a nation to gain 
competitiveness in the global trade through “reaching a higher terms of trade line than before” 
(Hall, 1994, p. 392) or upgrading the position in the global commodity chain (Gereffi, 1999). 
Naturally, for the firms, the main actors of the trading economy will also gain the capacity to 
have new products or improve the existing ones so that they can maintain profits and 
competitiveness in the trade (Alemu, 2013).  
Different from the viewpoint of comparative advantage, Freeman (2004) holds that a nation can 
enhance international competitiveness by a national innovation system. Specifically, a nation 
can make long-term investments in technological infrastructure (R&D) or promote technical 
innovation to minimize the technological gap, increase technical output, and finally enhance its 
competitiveness (Ibid.).  
Moreover, he points out that once the country gains technological leadership, it will obtain 
“absolute rather than comparative advantage” (p. 541).  
 20 
 
However, the positive effect of technical innovation for the external economy does not always 
work out efficiently, as the comparative advantage is not static but “dynamic and ever-changing” 
(Landau & Rosenberg, 1992, p. 114), and growth itself is “a highly path-dependent experience” 
(Ibid.). 
Besides the external economy, technological innovation also acts as an essential role in building 
up a knowledge-based economy, which is a form of modern economy involving the processes 
of “creation, acquisition, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge” (Kumar & van Welsum, 
2013, p. 5).  
The knowledge economy, defined by Powell and Snellman (2004) as “production and services 
based on knowledge-intensive activities” (p. 199), is driven by the development of “research 
and development, education, and learning on the job” (Kumar & van Welsum, 2013, p. 5). For 
Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz, and Lundvall (2016), this economy is centered on science, technology, 
innovation, and the learning process. 
With reference to Chen and Dahlman (2005), Kumar and van Welsum (2013) point out that 
there are four pillars to measure the knowledge economy: “Economic Incentive and Institutional 
Regime (policies and institutions for the protection of IP, the rule of law, the ease of starting a 
business), Education (human capital), Innovation (universities, firms, and research institutes, 
similar to organizational capital), and ICT (physical capital)” (p. 6). 
However, for the knowledge production-centered ideas, Powell and Snellman (2004) argue that 
knowledge dissemination and impact should be given more attention and, thus, point out that 
intellectual capabilities are much more critical than physical inputs for the establishment of a 
knowledge economy, and patents can be “an appropriate measure of stocks of knowledge” (p. 
215). 
Moreover, there is a growing literature that focus on the issue of promoting the developing 
economy (Lu, Zhang & Wang, 2010; Xu, Liu & Chen, 2002; Asian Development Bank-ADB, 
2007) through establishing the knowledge value chain, including “knowledge input, knowledge 
activities, knowledge output and knowledge innovation of service enterprise” (Lu, Zhang & 
Wang, 2010, p. 3033), improving the knowledge management, and finally, enhancing the 
competitive advantage in knowledge. 
2.2.3. IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
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A sustainable economy is characterized by the careful consideration of social, environmental, 
and economic factors and can realize the purposes of environmental protection and social 
progress in the process of economic growth (Fuentes, 1993; Gustance & Hillier, 1998; Thomas, 
2006; UNDP, 2015). 
Technological innovation can maintain sustainable development, as it can “further accelerate 
production and spur economic growth” (Santana, Rebelattto, Périco, Moralles & Filho, 2015, 
p. 425).  
Moreover, technological innovation can contribute to reducing negative impacts of industrial 
progress on society and nature through its constantly generating “new production alternatives” 
(Ibid.); ensure “a qualitative leap in environmental efficiency” (Fokkema et al., 2005, cit., 
Santana et al., 2015, p. 429); promote “economic vitality, environmental sustainability and 
social progress” (Santana et al., 2015, p. 429) to enhance the pillars of sustainability (Santana 
et al., 2015). 
Fuentes (1993) and Kim (2011) contribute a viewpoint of green technology to promoting an 
environmental-friendly economy, which refers to “product, service, or process that delivers 
value using limited or zero non-renewable resources and/or creates significantly less waste than 
conventional offerings” (Pernick, 2007, cit., Kim, 2011, p. 15).   
2.3.TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
In the international context, marked by globalization of an “economic, political, and social 
integration of states and societies, both horizontally and vertically, in tighter webs of 
interdependence” (de Soysa, 2003, p. 7), the most apparent way of technology transfer is a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008; Haggard & Cheng, 1992; Kostevc, 
Redek & Rojec, 2011; Ray, 1977). In this context, IP has played the role of legal protection 
(Lamberton, 1994; Teece, 1992).  
The FDI emerges as an instrument for multinational companies (MNCs) to maximize their 
profits (Ray, 1977). The MNCs, constituted by domestic oligopolies, view FDI as an alternative 
to “capture monopoly profits abroad” and to “maintain market positions abroad as alternative 
suppliers in the local market itself and other foreign countries become more competitive” (Ibid., 
p. 284).  
 22 
 
Also, they usually have relatively superior ‘firm-specific assets’ (FSA) concerning production 
techniques, know-how, or management strategy (Caves, 1996, cit., Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008). 
The FSA has some of the characteristics of public good and can enable the firm to locate 
profitably abroad (Ibid.). 
Considering the nature of public good, the FSA is difficult to protect by MNCs (Ibid.) in 
recipient areas with a technology gap (Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008). Local firms will use it once 
it is out on the external market (Caves, 1996, cit., Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008). Thus, the positive 
spillovers generate and help the recipients improve productivity (Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008).  
Besides spillovers, the recipient areas can be included automatically in the global value chain 
(GVC) by absorbing FDI, owing to “differentiated manufacturing processes integrated globally 
by the multinational corporation” (Frobel, 1981, cit., Haggard & Cheng, 1992, p. 91).  
To attract FDI, the receiving areas need to provide a good investment environment, not only in 
specific FDI policies but also in an adequate “regulatory-administrative and economic policy 
framework” (Kostevc, Redek & Rojec, 2011, p. 173). 
However, the positive spillovers can be mitigated by the increased competition generated by 
foreign companies, which may actually result in adverse effects on domestic firms’ productivity 
“if multinationals ‘steal business’ from domestic firms and force them up their average cost 
curve” (Aitken & Harrison, 1999, cit., Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008, p. 324).  
In this condition, legal protection is necessary, which is always in the form of IP, indicating a 
“wide range of rights that are conferred by the legal system about discrete items of information 
that have resulted from some form of human intellectual activity” (Ricketson, 1992, cit., 
Lamberton, 1994, p. 301). These activities include inventions, scientific discoveries, literary 
and artistic works, trading marks, and industrial designs (Lamberton, 1994).  
According to Teece (1992), IP can help innovators maintain the ‘first-mover’ advantages, and 
guarantee them with new products and know-how winning in the market.  
However, IP protection is not easy. Unlike machines with clear rights of ownership, the know-
how and skills, are intangible and quickly encounter being codified by others to save the high 
innovation costs (Teece, 1992; Lamberton, 1994), unless they fall into some of the categories 
of IP, “patents, copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks” (Teece, 1992, p. 177), in which the 
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innovation can be established with a case title, recognized with rights of assignment and finally 
obtain a limited protection (Teece, 1992). 
3. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND POWER 
International politics, according to Morgenthau (1985), share the nature of all politics of “a 
struggle for power” (p. 31) by nations in the political order. The technological innovation has 
been utilized by nations not only as the traditional military instrument (Greenwood, 1990; 
Koubi, 1999; Shimshoni, 1990-1991) but also as an instrument to exert foreign policy 
(Colglazier & Lyons, 2014; the Royal Society, 2010) to gain power (attractiveness) and enhance 
positions in world order (Gardner, 1998; Rosenberg, 1985; Song, 2016). 
3.1.NATURE OF POWER 
First of all, power can be perceived as force or capacity (Hobbes, 1651/2005), a perspective 
relatively static, belonging to the natural power defined by Hobbes (1651/2005), which contains 
“eminence of the faculties of body, or of mind; (as) extraordinary strength, beauty, prudence, 
capacity, eloquence, liberality, or nobility”2 (p. 83).  
Hobbes (1651/2005) also points out that attractiveness, the quality that makes other people love, 
can also constitute the element of power; that is, “what quality makes a man beloved or feared 
of many, is power because it is a means to have the assistance and service of many”3 (p. 84). 
However, both Boulding (1990) and Viotti (2001) held that capabilities could not be equated 
with power and only if they can execute influence over others through their distribution. This 
kind of power was named by Hobbes (1651/2005) as instrumental power to gain more power, 
or in international politics, utilized by a state to “influence or to coerce the behavior of another 
state or actor” (Viotti, 2001, p. 86). 
The effects of the distribution of capabilities, depending on the instruments and ways adopted 
by the actor, ultimately divide instrumental power into two categories: hard power and soft 
power (Boulding, 1990; Nye, Jr., 2004; Russell, 1990; Viotti, 2001).  
 
2 Translated by the author from the original version of “eminência das faculdades do corpo ou do espírito; 
extraordinária força, beleza, prudência, capacidade, eloquência, liberalidade ou nobreza”.  
3 Translated by the author from the original version of “qualquer qualidade que torna um homem amado, ou 
temido por muitos, é poder; porque constitui um meio para adquirir a ajuda e o serviço de muitos”. 
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Hard power, also known as crude power (Morgenthau, 1985), mainly exerts influence through 
threats or payments (Nye, Jr., 2004) and exist in the specific forms of military and economic 
power. 
Military power, as a destructive power, is always associated with the behavior of threat (“sticks”) 
(Boulding, 1990, Nye, Jr., 2004) and is “the most important factor making for the political 
power of a nation” (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 33).  
Economic power, as exchange power, exerts influence through inducements or payments 
(“carrots”) (Boulding, 1990; Nye, Jr., 2004), the process of which always involves bargaining 
(Boulding, 1990). In some conditions, the implementation of economic power needs some 
destructive element, serving as an instrument to promote the “development of a system of a law” 
(Boulding, 1990, p.28) as well as an instrument of punishment “for failure to live to contracts 
and (…) for failure to obey the principle of property” (Ibid.).  
However, not all the influences can be obtained by hard power, and not all the hard power can 
reach the purposes, as hard power has limitations in exerting influence (Nye, Jr., 2004). 
Nye, Jr. (2004) has remedied this condition by revealing the second face of power, namely soft 
power, which “co-opts people rather than coerces them” (p. 5) to attain the objectives. It usually 
tends to “shape the preferences of others” (Ibid.) with “intangible assets such as an attractive 
personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or 
having moral authority” (Nye, Jr., 2004, p. 6).  
Soft power engenders not only influence (Nye, Jr., 2004) but also an attraction, love, or respect 
related to “the integrative structures of pride and shame and perhaps guilt” (Boulding, 1990, p. 
29). 
3.2.TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND POWER 
It is noted that technological innovation is an effective way to increase economic capacity. 
Furthermore, technical progress is likely to be used to enhance military instruments, which is 
directly connected to a nation’s military strength (Bas & Coe, 2012; Hurlburt, 1979; Koubi, 
1999; Lautenschlager, 1985). More recently, technological innovation has been expanded to 
include the function of building up national attractiveness through science diplomacy 
(Colglazier, 2016; Colglazier & Lyons, 2014; Leijten, 2017; the Royal Society, 2010).  
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3.2.1. IN MILITARY CAPACITY 
Military technology has strategic importance for a nation, especially in wartime. According to 
Shimshoni (1900-1991), the qualitative nature of prevailing technologies determines the 
advantage of a nation. This was demonstrated by the technologies of the time during the First 
World War, like “railroads, machine guns, barbed wire” (Shimshoni, 1900-1991, p. 189), and 
the emergence of “nuclear threshold concept, laser-guided weapons, space surveillance systems” 
(Hurlburt, 1979, p. 108) in the Second World War (WWII). 
Besides their importance in wartime, Koubi (1999) indicates that military-use technologies 
have the potential to affect the international distribution of power. Bas and Coe echoed this 
viewpoint in 2012 with their ideas of that one state can invest in acquiring new military 
technologies to shift the balance of power. In this sense, a race for technological superiority 
among superpowers is likely to happen (Koubi, 1999), as their relative or absolute positions in 
the technological ladder can influence “the intensity of competition and hence the rate of 
introduction of new weapons” (Ibid., p. 540). 
Notwithstanding that the military technologies have been identified with negative impacts after 
witnessing the emergence of lethal and destabilizing weapons in history (Hurlburt, 1979; 
Lautenschlager, 1985; Shimshoni, 1990-1991), the literature (Greenwood, 1990; 
Lautenschlager, 1985) argues that it is difficult to restrain military instruments even under arms 
control agreements. 
The difficulty has two reasons: one is that the complexity of technological development makes 
it hard to identify the items to be controlled (Ibid.); the other is that military technologies have 
the apparent effects of “enhancing capabilities and cost-effectiveness (in performing missions); 
outperforming potential adversaries; symbolic roles; and preserving or improving stability” 
(Greenwood, 1990, p. 417). 
3.2.2. IN SCIENCE DIPLOMACY 
Science diplomacy emerges owing to the science and technology (the S&T) development and 
innovation that has affected “the relative importance of local, national, and transnational groups 
in world politics” (Fox, 1968, p. 3). The S&T is not only the indicator of national capacity but 
also the instrument to resolve problems among nations (Fox, 1968; Krige & Barth, 2006; 
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Mashelkar, 2017). In this sense, the traditional arms race among nations has given way to the 
S&T competition (Fox, 1968).  
The viewpoint of science diplomacy was first given by the Royal Society in 2010. They held 
that science is a source of soft power achieved by the channels of the scientific community in 
resolving “problems of common interest” (p. 15) beyond national boundaries; and of foreign 
policy utilizing the scientific exchange to implement “coalition-building and conflict resolution” 
(Ibid.). 
The Royal Society (2010) further divided the science diplomacy into three types, namely, 
science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy, specifically, 
“informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice; facilitating international science 
cooperation; using science cooperation to improve international relations between countries” 
(p. 15). 
Colglazier (2016) has contributed to the notion proposed by the Royal Society by combining 
science in diplomacy and science for diplomacy as a category of “science leaping over 
diplomacy” (no page), which has the essence of recognition of the science that can “create new 
pathways for making progress” (Ibid.) on the problems whether national, regional, or global, 
that are difficult to be resolved by the conventional means. 
Different from the perspective of the Royal Society, Leijten (2107) argues that science 
diplomacy is distinguished from the diplomacy for science, as it emphasizes “the use of the 
‘soft power’ of scientific collaboration to smoothen the political relations” (p. 1) between 
countries.  
For Leijten (2017), science diplomacy has been shifted to innovation diplomacy because of the 
tendency for an increasingly important role of knowledge in international relations. “The 
growth of the knowledge economy is pushing strategies and policies for a knowledge-based 
competition to the center of the scene, not only in national politics but also in foreign policy” 
(p. 13). Thus, it is useful for talking about innovation diplomacy, which encompasses science, 
technology, and their diffusion (Leijten, 2017). 
3.3.TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND WORLD ORDER 
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Technological innovation can affect the formation of political power. Thus, it has an indirect 
connection with world power distribution, specifically, the formation of world order. 
3.3.1. NATURE OF WORLD ORDER 
Ikenberry (2011) views the world order as “a hierarchical political order with liberal 
characteristics” (xi). It is a U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order (Ikenberry, 2011). Specifically, 
America led its allies to build up the order organized around “economic openness, multilateral 
institutions, security cooperation, and democratic solidarity” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 7). 
The Cold War’s conclusion has made the order distribute worldwide, and America, as the leader 
of the order, has obtained world hegemony. Since then, to the wider liberal order, America has 
fused its “political system, (…) alliances, technology, currency, and markets” (Ikenberry, 2011, 
p. 2).  
More scholars have echoed the viewpoint of a liberal order. Hu and Spence (2017) adds that 
the order is “an open system for trade in goods and services, supported by international 
institutions” (p. 54), allowing a relatively free-flowing across the border of capital, corporations, 
and people, which indirectly promotes a rapid spread of data and technology and highly 
improves the global living standards (Hu & Spence, 2017). 
However, the postwar liberal order, or ‘World Order 1.0,’ as named by Haass (2017) has 
become inadequate after various international problems have emerged, such as the affluence of 
tourists, the presence of terrorists and refugees, and the emergence of protectionism, 
nationalism, and populism (Haass, 2017; Hu & Spence, 2017; Nye, Jr., 2017).  
Moreover, the U.S., as the traditional provider of global public goods (Nye, Jr., 2017), “loses 
interest in nurturing the international order” (Hu & Spence, 2017, p. 55). Moreover, the world 
is undergoing “the passing of the American era of dominance” (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 4). At the 
same time, the new powers like China and India continue to grow and are likely to become the 
order challengers (Nye, Jr., 2017). 
Faced with an order crisis, Ikenberry (2011) assumed that maintaining the order will necessitate 
“a new bargain” (p. 7) among the major powers. Meanwhile, for Haass (2017), the ‘World 
Order 2.0’ is necessary to “expand and adapt the traditional principles of the international order 
for a highly interconnected world” (p. 2). In addition, new powers, like China, have to solve 
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problems to “replace the US as the sponsor of an open, multilateral order” (Hu & Spence, 2017, 
p. 55). 
3.3.2. DIVISION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ORDER 
In world politics, the nations are generally classified into developed, developing, and 
underdeveloped (de Soysa, 2009) according to comprehensive national strength. However, 
according to the interactions with the world order, the countries can be divided into three levels: 
primary operator, coordinator, and performer.   
To put it specifically, the U.S., as the absolute principle contributor of the order (Gilpin, 1987; 
Rosenberg, 1985), ranks at the first level; Japan, a successful “latecomer,” ally of the U.S., and 
the coordinator of the order (Frankel, 2015; Gardner, 1998; Payne, 2008; Tang, 2011), ranks at 
the second level; and the rest of the countries in development that are aiming to catch up with 
the developed ones (Gardner, 1998; Song, 2016) are primarily performers within the order 
(Vezirgiannidou, 2013) and rank at the third level.   
Since 1945, the U.S. has gained technological dominance transferred from Britain, as it gained 
the pioneering position in structural transformation involved in shifting to new industries 
(Rosenberg, 1985). The superior position in mass production industries and high-technology 
industries have constituted American technological leadership (Nelson & Wright, 1992; 
Rosenberg, 1985).  
The technological leadership has contributed to America’s hegemony (Gilpin, 1987). Naturally, 
the U.S. is the “hegemonic organizer and manager” (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 2) of the order.  
As one of the pillars of American technological dominance, the high-technology industries 
commonly involve high development costs to maintain and higher costs to move toward higher 
performance levels (Rosenberg, 1985).  
The logic also applies to maintaining America’s dominating position in the world order. In the 
process of maintaining hegemony and sustaining liberal order, the U.S. has accumulated a huge 
foreign debt and encountered a productivity decline, a trade surplus, and competitive economies 
(Gilpin, 1987) until found itself caught “between its many commitments and decreased power, 
the classic position of a declining hegemon” (Gilpin, 1981, cit., Gilpin, 1987, p. 347). 
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Relative to America’s industrialization, Japan is a latecomer (Gardner, 1998). In the late 
nineteenth century, Japan established a modern world through rapid industrialization, 
specifically by opening itself to foreign trade, attempting to close the technology gap, 
establishing state-run businesses, and supporting private industry (Gardner, 1998; Tang, 2011). 
Though the modern Japanese economy was destroyed by the devastation of WWII, it still made 
use of its conditions to create a growth miracle and then became the second-largest industrial 
country (Gardner, 1998).  
This economic miracle has mostly benefited from Japan’s being an American ally. Thus, Japan 
has not only obtained access to “U.S. markets for industrial products, technologies, and 
investment” (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998, p. 176) but also turned into a coordinator of the 
order. With America’s support, Japan became one of the members of Group Five (G5) led by 
America (Payne, 2008; Frankel, 2015).  
Japan is a successful catching-up country owing to its earlier establishment of an industrial base 
(Gardner, 1998; Song, 2016).  
At present, the ‘catching-up’ countries are mainly constituted by emerging economies that are 
struggling to change the situation of technological laggards (Song, 2016). These countries 
always have a technology gap. Even so, they can benefit from global technological diffusion 
and obtain “technological advances made by first-comer countries” (Gerschenkron, 1962, cit., 
Perkins & Neumayer, 2005, p. 791) through the direct methods of FDI or technology purchase, 
which are generally executed under national incentive strategies or indirect ways of knowledge 
spillovers (Bell & Pavitt, 1997; Hayter & Edgington, 2004, cit., Perkins & Neumayer, 2005; 
Song, 2016).   
Having gained the emerging capacity in the process of ‘catching-up,’ the countries have been 
named new powers, “not traditional U.S. allies” (Vezirgiannidou, 2013, p. 635). They have 
contributed to the reinforcement of the multilateral world order (Vezirgiannidou, 2013).   
In the hierarchical order, it is difficult to change the existing ranking. According to the power 
transition theory, power shifts may lead to conflicts or war, namely, “shifts in power, most 
caused by rapid economic growth in one party relative to a hegemonic status quo power, is 
likely to lead to war” (Foot, 2017, p. 830).  
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As developed from the power transition model (Lee, 2019), American scholar Allison in 2015 
coined the term “Thucydides Trap” to emphasize the instability that occurred in the relations 
between the U.S. and China led by a structural change that was caused by China’s rise.  
However, Zhang (2019) held that Allison’s trap “highlights the emotional changes induced by 
the shifting balance of material capability” (p. 130), and emphasizes “irrationality of behavior” 
(p. 132). He then added that the trap theory is different from the power transition theory, which 
“assumes that states make rational calculation of power and interest” (Ibid.). 
It can be found that both the origins of the theories and their cases have centered on a capitalist 
background and a liberal economy. They have not provided the experiences of a non-capitalist 
developing country and analyzed it to see if it can make use of technological innovations to 
maintain development and achieve strategic rising in the world order.  
In the second part, therefore, we will focus on the case of China and will testify if the 
mechanism of technological innovation can still be useful for China in promoting its 
development and accelerating its rising position in international politics.  
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PART 2 MIC2025: CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY THROUGH 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION  
1. THE DUAL INSTRUMENTAL FUNCTION OF MIC2025 
In May 2015, CSC issued the document Notice of the State Council on Issuing the “Made in 
China (2025)”4. MIC2025 is a manufacturing plan that will help China build up “a powerful 
manufacturing industry” (CSC, 2015, no page). Implementing the plan is “the only way” (Ibid.) 
for China to “upgrade comprehensive national competitiveness, guarantee national security, 
and finally become a global power” (Ibid.).  
China made the MIC2025 its industrial upgrade plan with several considerations.  
According to the CSC’s Notice, China is still in the process of industrializing and confronting 
itself with a large gap in relation to industrialized countries in technology. This gap can be 
demonstrated by China’s high dependence on other countries in terms of core technologies and 
equipment of high technology (Ibid.).  
On the other hand, there is currently a worldwide tendency to readjust national manufacturing 
chains that is motivated by the increasing combination of information technology and 
manufacturing. This tendency can be proven by the emergence of re-industrialization plans 
made by the majority of G7 members, the traditional industrial countries (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 The document has the original name in Chinese as, “国务院关于印发《中国制造 2025》的通知” 
(Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa “zhongguo zhizao 2025” de tongzhi). 
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Table 1 Re-industrialization plans of traditional industrial countries 
Country  Re-industrial policies  Launching date 
America A National Strategic Plan for Advanced 
Manufacturing 
February 2012 
French  New Industrial France program September 2013 
Germany Industry 4.0 for the digital transformation of 
manufacturing 
October 2013 
Japan Society 5.0 for a digital transformation across all 
levels of the Japanese society 
January 2016 
Great 
Britain 
Manufacturing the Future Initiative  April 2011 
Industrial plan of Building our Industry Strategy (in 
Green Paper) 
January 2017 
Italy  Industrial National Plan 4.0 September 2016 
Source: Compiled by the author with the data collected from Xue et al. (2018). 
Therefore, MIC2025 is intended to put China on an accelerated path to industrialization. With 
this plan, China can achieve three transformations, namely, “from being made in China to be 
created in China; from the title of China’s speed to the one of China’s quality; from the presence 
of China’s products to one of China’s brands” (CSC, 2015, no page).  
However, the plan is quite different from China’s traditional industrial plan5, which has a short 
period and concentrates on specific projects. MIC2025 will last till 2049, the 100th anniversary 
of the People’s Republic of China. Thus, it is not merely a manufacturing plan, but rather a 
strategy that leads to the China Dream. 
The China Dream (Zhongguo meng) is a concept that was formally brought forth in the 
Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (the 18th NCCPC) on 29 
November 2012, becoming an essential part of the ideology of Xi Jinping (People.cn, 2017).  
The dream indicates the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. More precisely, it will 
implement the goals of “two 100s” (liangge yibainian ): one is that China becomes a moderately 
well-off society (xiaokang shehui) 6 by the year 2021, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese 
 
5. The traditional industrial plan is made up of a five-year plan, which is short for the five-year plan for the 
national economy and social development of PRC, constituting an essential part in China's national economic 
development plan. It is concentrated on major national projects, distribution of production force, and 
organization of relations among different units of the national economy. In 1953, the government made the first 
five-year plan. In the current period, China is in its 13th five-year plan. 
6 Moderately well-off society was the first goal that was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping on 6 December 1979, 
indicating modernization of China, specifically that China's per capita GNP would reach U.S. $800 at the end of 
the twentieth century. 
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Communist Party; the other is that China becomes a fully modernized nation (qianmiande 
xiandaihua guojia) 7 by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China.  
According to the Chinese government (Ibid.), a modernized China will regain its position as a 
leader in S&T as well as in economics and business; as such, there will be a resurgence of 
Chinese civilization along with its cultural and military might. Also, China can participate 
actively in all areas of human endeavor. In this sense, China will attempt to become a global 
power via modernization.  
In order for China to become a global power, MIC2025 has a three-step timeline in 
manufacturing terms. Namely, 
➢ By 2025, China will improve the informatization of manufacturing industries and have 
several MNCs and industrial clusters with global competitiveness, helping China rise in 
the GVC.  
➢ By 2035, China will accomplish industrialization and have some core technologies in key 
industrial sectors; thus, it will obtain a leading position in competitive industries. 
➢ By 2049, China will have an advanced industrial system and will stand on the technological 
frontier and thus will become a manufacturing power.  
Therefore, the CSC has given MIC2025 the nature of a dual instrumental function in the very 
beginning; here, we speak of an industrial upgrade plan with the strategic goal of fulfilling the 
China Dream. 
With this strategic purpose, the government has listed ten sectors (see Figure 3) on the 
Technology Roadmap of Key Sectors of MIC2025 (the Roadmap), which was launched shortly 
after the Notice (in October of 2015). 
 
7 To become a fully modernized nation was the second goal that was initiated formally in the 19th National 
Congress of the CPC in October 2017.   
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Figure 3 Ten critical sectors of MIC2025 
Source: http://www.catl.org.cn/2016-05/05/content_38388927.htm   
New information technology has been given priority on the list as it is closely related to the 
fourth industrial revolution. This revolution emphasizes smart manufacturing by connecting 
machines, items, and employees in virtual reality by means of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
(Szozda, 2017). This virtual reality functions by digital connections; thus, information and 
communication technology (ICT) will “dominate future business models” (Ibid., p. 401). In 
other words, ICT is crucial for global competitiveness for nations.  
In the Roadmap of 2015, China listed three items for ICT, namely, wireless communication 
technology, new-generation networks, and high-performance computers and servers (National 
Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee - NMSAC, 2015). However, in the renewed 
Roadmap of 2017, the ICT was reduced to two items: wireless communication technology and 
new-generation networks (NMSAC & Chinese Academy of Engineering - CAE, 2017).  
Both items have the same structure, including demand, goals, key products, key technologies, 
application projects, and political supports. Thus, we have selected the wireless communication 
technology industry to analyze the nature of its innovation.  
Technological innovation is an original process of generating new technologies through the 
creative destruction of the existing ones (Elster, 1983). Thus, innovators can produce new goods 
and obtain a higher productivity (Hall, 1994).  
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Wireless communication technology has the nature of technological innovation. Per figure 4, 
China will make use of its current communication technologies and industrial base to achieve 
the informatization of manufacturing processes. Based on accumulated communication 
technologies, China will likely become one of the leading introducers of the new generation of 
networking, 5G, and to open and occupy new markets (NMSAC, 2015). 
 
Figure 4 Technology roadmap for the wireless communication industry8 
Source: Translated by the author with the figure from Roadmap 2015 from NMSAC 
Regarding the determinants of technological innovation, this technology is highly influenced 
by demand. Namely, there is a growing need for wireless mobile communication worldwide, 
with an estimated 7.2 billion users in 2020 and 7.5 billion users in 2025 (Ibid.).   
On the other hand, it is also designed to help China achieve a strategic rise in global 
technological ranking. China may become one of the countries making 5G standards until 2020 
(Ibid.).   
With a forceful strategic push, the Chinese government will become the main actor. It will offer 
preferential policies regarding industrial resources and assistance of internalization for the 
 
8 To save the space, the author has used some abbreviations in the figure. They are MCSE for mobile 
communication system equipment, MT for mobile terminals, MTC for mobile terminal chips, and MCTI for 
mobile communication test instruments.   
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accomplishment of the roadmap. As shown in the figure, the wireless communication industry 
will obtain preferences in the distribution spectrum (one ICT resource) and will enjoy the 
“going global” policy (Ibid.).  
From this industry’s roadmap, it can be noted that MIC2025 is highly dependent on 
technological innovation and is heavily mission-oriented.    
MIC2025 offers an innovation-driven trajectory for China’s prospective development, which is 
quite different from China’s current trajectory that depends on exports and investment. As every 
trajectory has momentum once it has been selected and established, it is not easy to shift to an 
alternative (Dosi, 1984; Hall, 1994). Thus, it is doubtful that China can successfully shift from 
the current trajectory to the new one. 
On the other hand, MIC2025 has a strategic mission of achieving “self-sufficiency” (CSC, 2015, 
no page) of basic components of the manufacturing industry. Specifically, by 2020 and 2025, 
China can independently produce core components, with a percentage of 40% and 70% 
respectively. Generally, China will have “a clear decline in dependence on core foreign 
technologies” (Ibid.). Thus, it is possible that China, with more technological independence, 
will shift from multilateralism to unilateralism or protectionism.  
These analyses lead to the basic research question: Is the MIC2025 with a dual instrumental 
function, an instrument for China’s development strategy in order to enhance its position in the 
world order?  
Accurately, the next section (section 2) will analyze the conditions of China’s shifting to an 
innovation-driven trajectory, and if successful, it will place the country on the path of 
sustainable development; if not, China might fall into the MIT. The following section (section 
3) will analyze if China can use its rise to contribute to a multilateral word or drop in the TT.  
2. PROSPECTIVE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT: MIT OR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT? 
2.1.RISK OF FALLING INTO THE MIT 
In 2010, China became the world’s second-largest economy measured by GDP, attributed to its 
GDP-centered development model. However, it is still a middle-income country measured by 
GDP per capita of U.S. $4382 (Cai, 2012). 
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Various phenomena have emerged indicating that China’s comparative advantages have been 
“squeezed between the low-wage poor-country competitors that dominate in mature industries 
and the rich-country innovators that dominate in industries undergoing rapid technological 
change” (Garrett, 2004, cit., Gill et al., 2007, p. 5). Specifically, China has been experiencing 
an economic slowdown, various environmental problems, severe development disparity, and a 
gradually aging society. Under these circumstances, it can be noted that China’s traditional 
development model has been exhausting its effectiveness and will probably lead China to the 
MIT. 
First, China’s economy is slowing down. In 2012 (see Figure 5), China’s GDP growth rate 
dropped below 8%, which is a long-term economic growth target for China (People Daily, 
2017). Since then, the economy has maintained its declining momentum and remained in a mid- 
and low-rate speed. 
 
Figure 5 Trend of the growth rate of China’s GDP in 1978 – 2018 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from the World Bank site 
Besides economic slowdown, the traditional development pattern, which is highly dependent 
on investment and exports, has generated a variety of problems both in environmental 
sustainability and social justice.  
In China, investment mainly goes in the direction of energy industries such as coal, steel, and 
cement, which can generate rapid GDP growth. Thus, they are mainly located in the resource-
rich areas, like China’s west, northeast, and northwest. The emphasis on energy and 
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infrastructures has maintained a vital share in China’s total investment, keeping in a proportion 
of 8% until 2010 (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 Share of investment in energy industries in total investment 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from the NBSC site 
Different from the concentration of energy industries in inland areas, the export industries are 
located mainly in southeast and coastal areas, as they are the destination of the majority of FDI 
in China. In these areas, companies mainly export products by processing and assembling, 
which is highly dependent on human resources.  
Both methods of production have resulted in environmental problems. In inland areas, the 
energy industry and industry of energy consumption have developed with the absence of 
pollution prevention measures. Therefore, these areas have problems of land, water, and air 
pollution, of which air pollution is the most apparent. In Figure 7, air pollution is made up of 
particles (PM2.5 and PM10) and harmful gases (O3, SO2, NO2, and CO). Among 338 Chinese 
cities investigated in 2018, only 25.7% of the cities had good air quality, and 20.7% had air 
pollution at different levels (see Figure 8).   
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Figure 7 Species of air pollutant in China 
Source: China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment 
 
Figure 8 Air quality of 338 Chinese cities in 2018 
Source: China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment 
In the meantime, for the coastal areas, to meet the enormous needs of plastics, paper, and metal 
in low-end manufacturing, China has become an essential destination of global industrial solid 
waste, receiving 4.5 million tons in 1995 to 45 million tons in 2016 (Xinhua, 2018). Without 
the awareness and capacity for refuse disposal, this refuse, mainly chemical and electronic, has 
heavily polluted the land and water of China’s host areas (Ibid.). 
Besides environmental problems, this development trajectory (based on exports and investment) 
is also leading to growing asymmetries among the Chinese regions. As with the different effects 
of the two methods, southeast areas that use exports are more productive than the inland areas 
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that use investments. In Figure 9, the east area has a GDP share (53.35%) over the total share 
of the other three areas. In this sense, China’s development has been in a stage of severe 
disequilibrium. 
 
Figure 9 Share of the GDP of each area in national GDP in the first three quarters of 
2018 
Source: Translated by the author with the figure retrieved from http://www.cre.org.cn/list2/qyjj/14750.html 
China’s comparative advantage is attributed mainly to its large cheap labor force. However, 
China has been losing this advantage due to its reduced natural growth rate and its shift to an 
aging society. In Figure 10, we can see that China’s natural growth rate has kept decreasing in 
the last three decades. Even though the two-child policy was substituted for the one-child policy 
in 2015 and gave an impulse to a natural growth rate, after 2016, the rate continued falling off.  
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Figure 10 China’s demographic situation in 1978 – 2018 (‰) 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from the NBSC site 
Moreover, in Figure 11, we see that the percentage of the young population (in the 0 – 14 age 
group) is shrinking. According to the data of the World Health Organization (WHO) (2015), 
China’s population aged above 60 will reach 0.402 billion, which will be 28% of the total 
population in 2040. It means that China will become an aging society before its full 
modernization in 2049. 
 
Figure 11 Proportion of China’s different age groups in 1990 – 2018 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from the NBSC site 
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Therefore, from these perspectives, it is difficult for China to fulfill sustainable development 
supported by three pillars, namely, “economic vitality, environmental sustainability, and social 
progress” (Santana et al., 2015, p. 429). In this sense, China has a high risk of falling into the 
MIT. 
2.2.PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS FOR ACCOMPLISHING MIC2025 
Confronted with the risk of MIT, China will attempt to carry out MIC2025 to achieve 
sustainable development. In this sense, it is meaningful to explore China’s pre-existing 
conditions for performing the plan from the perspective of China’s S&T policies, its 
technological base, and its foreign investment. 
2.2.1. CHINA’S S&T POLICIES  
China’s S&T policies have evolved in four stages (Xue et al., 2018). Each stage has its priorities, 
features, targets, and projects (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 Four stages of China’s S&T policies’ evolution 
Periods  Priorities Characteristic 
features  
Targets Projects 
1978 - 
1998 
high-tech 
industries 
affirmation of 
S&T’s position 
revitalizing China’s 
economy by science 
and education  
the Spark Plan; 
the Torch Plan.  
1998 - 
2006 
innovation of 
knowledge 
formation of a 
national 
innovation 
system 
building up national 
innovation bases;  
a national system of 
R&D; 
a modern system of 
science academy. 
 
institutes on studying 
nanoscience, genome, 
photoelectricity, and 
planet environment; 
projects on 
cooperation between 
internal universities 
and foreign academies. 
2006 - 
2012 
independent 
innovation 
focus on major 
special 
projects; 
emphasis on 
basic research 
and talent 
cultivation 
till 2020, the 
proportion of R&D 
will reach 2.5% of 
GDP;  
the proportion of 
commercialization 
of technological 
progress will reach 
60%;  
the proportion of 
dependence of 
foreign technologies 
will decrease to 
30%;  
the number of 
patents and papers 
of Chinese will both 
reach the world’s 
top 5. 
projects of electronics, 
chip, software, and 
communication; 
plans on attracting 
talents, for instance, 
the Yangtze River 
Scholar Plan, the 
Hundred Talents 
Program, and the 
Thousand Talents 
Program.   
2012 - 
2017 
innovation-
driven 
development 
strategy for 
China to 
become a 
technological 
innovation 
power in 2050 
China’s position in 
overall innovation 
capacity reaches the 
world’s top 15 
 
projects in the 
MIC2025 
Source: Compiled by the author with the data collected from Xue et al. (2018). 
The first stage laid an essential foundation for China’s S&T development. In this stage, the 
government gradually confirmed S&T’s strategic position at various conferences9. Then, the 
government started to introduce industrial policies to promote S&T in different areas (Li, 2018).  
 
9 First, in the National Science Conference in 1978, the government abandoned the inferior position of S&T 
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The second stage mainly aims to establish a national innovation system under the oversight of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (the Academy). With the academy’s proposals, the 
government started to build up the national innovation bases, a new national R&D system, and 
a modern system of science academies. Moreover, under the leadership of the Academy, China 
set up institutes for industrial purposes and tried new forms of cooperation between the internal 
and the foreign academies (Mu, 2018).  
With the technological base founded previously, China started to make long-term programs for 
independent innovation at the third stage. CSC made the programs in 2006 in the name of 
National Medium- and Long-term S&T Development Programs (2006-2020) (the Programs). 
The Programs are designed to enhance China’s capacity for independent innovation. Under the 
Programs, China has listed major special projects and talent cultivation plans (Cao, Li & Sun, 
2018).  
The fourth stage is still in the period of the Programs. However, this stage concentrates on 
innovation-driven development strategy with which China attempts to become a technological 
innovation power in 2050 (Chen, 2018). 
2.2.2. CHINA’S TECHNOLOGICAL BASE 
China’s technological base has been constructed by two channels. One is the indigenous 
innovation motivated by S&T policies; the other is technological spillovers generated by FDI.   
The indigenous innovations are proven by the growing R&D investment and development in 
human resource development and IP protection. 
China has increased its R&D investment along with rapid economic growth. In 2016, the R&D 
investment reached 1567.7 billion yuan, with a proportion of 2.11% in GDP. In the total R&D 
investment, the basic research had a proportion of 5.20% in 2016 (Fang & Gong, 2018). 
The growing investment in basic research leads to a yearly growing production of papers. In 
2016, the number of China’s papers in the Web of Science rose to the world top 2, close to the 
U.S. Also, for the number of papers being cited, China ranked the second yet having a gap with 
 
formed in the Cultural Revolution and confirmed it as a force of production. Second, in the 12th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1982, the S&T was regarded as an essential part of national 
economic development. Third, in the 13th National Congress of CPC in 1987, science and education were given 
priority in driving economic development. Lastly, in the National Technological Congress in 1995, the S&T was 
confirmed with the strategic position.  
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the U.S. in total number. Besides, China’s patent number has increased, ranking fourth in 2015 
(Ibid.).  
Regarding specific industries, China has made progress in several industries of high-technology 
and obtained core technologies in space exploration, high-speed railway (HSR), and clean 
energy (wind and solar energy). Besides, China has also developed an internet industry through 
a secondary innovation. Its success is demonstrated by the performance of China’s three tech 
giants, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT)10. 
The affirmation of S&T has helped revitalize China’s universities. The government launched 
various projects to improve the R&D capacity of universities by “211 projects” in 1995 and 
“985 projects” in 1998. In order to hasten the commercialization of the R&D capacity of the 
universities, the government made a specific model. It combined the government, industries, 
universities, research centers, and markets (Liang & Li, 2018). Under this model, China has 
made a breakthrough in high-tech industries, represented by HSR (Ibid.). 
FDI is the other important channel that has helped China build up its technological base. In the 
international context, FDI can effectively make technology transfer by MNCs (Ray, 1977). As 
the MNCs usually have relatively superior FSA (production technique, know-how, or 
management strategy) (Caves, 1996, cit., Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008), the recipient country can 
obtain positive spillovers according to its absorptive capacity (Girma, Gorg & Pisu, 2008); also, 
it can be included automatically in the GVC (Frobel, 1981, cit., Haggard & Cheng, 1992). 
To attract FDI and build up the absorptive capacity, the Chinese government has made various 
proceedings to build up its attractiveness and absorptive capacity, the most obvious of which is 
the establishment of various economic zones.  
Specifically, from 1979 to 1990, China had opened up its markets in a gradient form, from 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to open coastal economic cities, then to open economic regions, 
and lastly to open inner cities (MOFCOM site, n.d.), namely: 
⚫ At the end of 1979, Guangdong and Fujian provinces obtained more decision-making 
power and preferential policies. 
 
10 Baidu has learned from Google and adapted the searching engine in China's market;  
Alibaba has learned from Amazon and eBay and set up China's e-commerce network;  
Tencent has learned from Facebook and Twitter and concentrated on social communication. 
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⚫ In 1980, the four SEZs of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen were set up in 
Guangdong as well as Fujian. 
⚫ In 1988, the fifth SEZ of Hainan province was set up. 
⚫ In 1990, fourteen open coastal economic cities, five open coastal economic regions, and 
forty open economic zones of inner cities were established. 
The government has equipped these zones with not only the regulation of joint corporations and 
taxation (see Table 3) but also modern financial institutions. For instance, China’s first group 
of modern financial institutions was set up in Shenzhen, the first SEZ in China (see Table 4). 
Table 3 Legislation on foreign investment in China 
Year Legislation 
1979 Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures 
1980 Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment 
1986 Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-funded Enterprises 
1988 Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint 
Ventures 
1991 Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign 
1995 Holding Company Law of Foreign-Funded Enterprises of the People's Republic 
of China 
2007 Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China 
2019 Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China11 
Source: Compiled by the author with the data collected from 
http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?specialthree=lywzjybsrfzjd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 This law substitutes the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-funded Enterprises, Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, and Enterprise Income Tax Law of 
the People's Republic of China. It will come into force on January 1, 2020. 
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Table 4 The first group of financial institutions founded in Shenzhen 
Year Financial institutions Nature 
1982 Nanyang Commercial Bank foreign capital 
1982 Ming An Insurance Corporation foreign capital  
1985 Shenzhen Foreign Exchange Adjustment Center Chinese capital 
1986 China International Finance Co., Ltd joint capital 
1987 China Merchants Bank Chinese capital  
1987 Shenzhen Development Bank Chinese capital 
1987 Shenzhen Stock Company Chinese capital 
Source: Compiled by the author with the data collected from 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/3225D180C7A04FE193C2D4872594BA9E.html and 
www.financialnews.com.cn/gc/ch/201805/t20180521_138446.html     
Due to its geographical and cultural proximity, China’s opening markets first attracted investors 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Though the investment was mainly used in the service and real 
estate industries, advanced methods of production were brought in automatically (Ibid.).  
Besides the element of proximity, the FDI trend is closely related to China’s openness, the 
world economy, bilateral relations with other areas, and the trading policies of other areas, 
which can be seen in Figure 12. 
  
Figure 12 Origins of China’s FDI from 1990 to 2015 
Source: MOFCOM, 2016 
In 1992, China decided to establish a socialist market economic system, which gave an 
incentive for the investment in China, mainly from Japan, the U.S., and European countries. 
Later, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 gave it another motive. Thus, in the Figure, the 
FDI shows a rapid increase after 1992 and 2001. 
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In 2001, the U.S. experienced an economic slowdown (UNCTAD, 2002), directly affecting its 
investment in China. Also, in 2004, the U.S. decided to repatriate the foreign affiliates of its 
companies by the American Jobs Creation Act (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development-OECD, 2018), which made the U.S. outward investment shrink worldwide. After 
2002, American FDI decreased rapidly in China. 
Besides the world economy tendency, bilateral relations also affect FDI in China. The sharp 
decline of Japan’s investment in China in 2005 was due to worsened relations by historical 
issues12 (Huanqiu, 2005; Xie, 2013), and the one in 2010 was due to the incident on the 
controversial Diaoyu Islands13 (Xie, 2013).  
Lastly, a trading policy will also affect FDI. In 2006, the EU took a protectionist stance towards 
the Chinese market; thus, around this year, the EU’s FDI remained low in China (Zhang, 2012).  
As with more investment, the destination of FDI has diversified and flowed into the 
manufacturing and service industries (see Figure 13). Through processing, assembling parts of 
commodities and exporting, Chinese companies have been included in the GVC automatically.  
 
Figure 13 Distribution of foreign investment in China from 1997 to 2017 
Source: MOFCOM, 2018 
Besides, more MNCs have directly established headquarters and research centers in China, 
occupying an essential share in the country’s total R&D activities. Specifically, in 2016, 
foreign-invested enterprises 14  had research personnel representing 22.8% of China’s total, 
 
12  The historical issues indicate that in 2005, the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of WWII, the Japanese 
Government rejected its war crimes in its WWII Anniversary Resolution; and the then Prime Minister Koizumi 
visited the war criminal-related Yasukuni Shrine for the fifth time. 
13  The Diaoyu Islands are known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan. They are controversial islands for China and 
Japan. In 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with Japanese patrol boats near the Islands. 
14 The foreign-invested enterprises include those from the areas of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, China’s 
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R&D expenditure represented 22.1%, and a number of patents represented 19.1% (China’s 
Ministry of Commerce - MOFCOM, 2018). In this sense, Chinese companies can gain positive 
spillovers from those activities and improve their productivity. 
In SEZs, the concentration of FDI has attracted millions of labors and talents from inner cities. 
The employment directly provided by foreign-invested companies reached 2.8 million in 1991 
and 45 million in 2011 (Ibid.). The large quantity of labor and talent has increased the 
innovative capacity of the zones. Subsequently, in the process of innovation diffusion from 
MNCs and native companies, more companies have joined via further innovation. Chinese 
innovation clusters have thusly formed and gathered in these areas. 
Regarding IP protection, China is a latecomer (Wang, 2018). Such is the case even though 
China has had its IP system developed for more than three decades (see Table 5). In 1980, China 
established the Patent Office of China (CPO) and acceded to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) (Cao, 2014). China’s joining the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property in 1985 and its signing of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) agreement in 2001 have contributed mainly to the globalization of China’s IP 
system (Wang, 2018). Besides this, since 2009, the government has made efforts to “more 
effectively” (Cao, 2014, p. 42) protect IP in making patent law, copyright law, and trademark 
law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Commerce, 2018. 
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Table 5 Milestones in the progress of China’s IP system 
Year Milestones 
1980 The CPO was established. China acceded to WIPO. 
1982 The Trademark Law was enacted. 
1984 The Patent Law was adopted. 
1985 China joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 
1989 China joined the Madrid Agreement on International Registration of Trademarks. 
1990 The Copyright Law was promulgated. 
1992 The Patent Law was amended to extend the scope of protection.  
China entered the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, and the Universal Copyright Convention. 
1993 The Trademark Law was revised. 
1998 The State Intellectual Property Office was established, which superseded the CPO. 
2000 The Patent Law was amended for the second time. 
2001 The Copyright Law was amended; the Trademark Law was again revised and took 
effect; China was accepted into the WTO and signed TRIPS. 
Source: Cao, 2014, p. 42. 
However, despite the progress in China’s IP system, we cannot ignore the existence of IP 
infringement in China (Cao, 2014; Yang & Zeng, 2010). On the one hand, it is due to China’s 
inadequate law enforcement (Cao, 2014); on the other hand, China’s industrial design has 
focused mainly on secondary innovation or re-innovation (Ibid.). This gave rise to China’s 
Shanzhai, namely, “imitation or pirated brands” (Ibid., p. 44). Though re-innovations can save 
R&D costs and gain economic benefits quickly (Yang & Zeng, 2010), they eventually “hinder 
IP law enforcement and, in turn, motivate IP counterfeiters” (Cao, 2014, p. 44). In this sense, 
China’s IP protection is still weak.  
As an IP protection system is more critical than physical inputs (Powell & Snellman (2004), 
only through building up a good IP protection environment can China maintain the first-mover 
advantages from technological innovation. It can also guarantee innovators with new products 
winning in the market (Teece, 1992), which further forms technological competitiveness. 
2.2.3. CHINA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND REVERSE KNOWLEDGE 
SPILLOVERS 
As with economic growth, China has had a growing need for more advanced technologies. 
However, it has been in the list of controlled transactions of core technologies by America under 
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the consideration of national security and industrial competitiveness 15 . Also, indigenous 
innovation needs massive investment, yet with a high risk of failure. 
In this sense, China launched the “going global” strategy in 1998, encouraging companies of 
multiple systems of ownership to go out and explore the global market by outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI). 
China’s OFDI has been motivated by its foreign exchange reserves (FERs). In 2006, China 
became the world’s largest holder of FERs of U.S. $1066.3 billion (People Daily, 2013). Since 
then, China’s OFDI has gained rapid growth (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 The flow of China’s OFDI in 1992 – 2012 
Source: MOFCOM, 2012 
China’s OFDI generally has two types: one is for resource-seeking and market-seeking in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America; the other is for asset-seeking in Europe and North America. 
Chinese SOEs and big private companies have constituted the OFDI’s actors. They mainly flow 
into the industries of manufacturing, mining, finance, leasing, and commercial services, 
wholesale and retail, in Europe and North America. In addition to these areas, information 
technology in North America has also been a target (see Figure 15 and Figure 16). 
 
15 China has been in the list of Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control and of its subsequent 
alternative, Wassennar Arrangement. To export high-tech to China, one has to obtain a license from the Bureau 
of Industry and Security of the American Department of Commerce. 
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Figure 15 Distribution of China’s OFDI in Europe in 2017 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from MOFCOM, 2018 
 
 
Figure 16 Distribution of China’s OFDI in the North America in 2017 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from MOFCOM, 2018 
The U.S. has been the primary destination for China’s OFDI. Besides the aforementioned 
industries, Chinese companies also invest in scientific research and technical services (see 
Figure 17). 
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Figure 17 Distribution of China’s OFDI in the U.S. in 2017 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from MOFCOM, 2018 
The S&T investment is vital for China since Chinese companies can obtain technological 
spillovers with geographical proximity in the U.S. Thus, according to the MOFCOM (2018), at 
the end of 2017, the U.S. was the second-largest hosting place for China’s overseas enterprises 
(with Hongkong being the largest). 
After gaining advanced technologies and methods of production, those companies would be 
likely to transmit to their host companies in China. The transfer has given out reverse 
knowledge spillovers, bearing a decisive contribution to improving technologies and methods 
of production at home. 
2.3.THE LIMITATIONS OF ACCOMPLISHING MIC2025 
Though China has made a specific technological base, it has limitations in implementing the 
plan. 
First of all, entrepreneurs, as the main protagonists in the process of innovation (McCraw, 2007), 
have been suppressed in China. In other words, China’s economic system relies on the 
preponderance of public ownership, which causes preferential policies to go mainly to SOEs. 
They are dominant in critical economic sectors, like energy, oil refining, finance, real estate, 
and others (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18 Share of public ownership in traditional industries in 2014 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from  
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0322/c1004-29161492.html  
Though SOEs have occupied 20% of the total profits of the top 500 Chinese companies (China 
Daily, 2018), they have the problems of low efficiency and inflexibility and are the main actors 
in the surplus production of coal, steel, and electric power (see Figure 19). The surplus 
production has resulted in a high risk of deficit for the SOEs. At the end of 2014, over 35% of 
the SOEs were in a deficit state (People.cn, 2017). 
 
Figure 19 Share of public ownership in surplus productivity in 2014 
Source: Made by the author with the data collected from  
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0322/c1004-29161492.html 
On the contrary, private companies are much more efficient and flexible. Table 6 shows that 
they can reach a higher ratio of return on equity. 
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Table 6 Comparison of return on equity ratio between the SOEs and the private 
enterprises 
Year SOEs Private ones 
2013 11.20% 25.60% 
2014 10.10% 22.50% 
2015 7.30% 21.20% 
2016 7.20% 20.60% 
2017 9.40% 19.60% 
Source: Compiled by the author with the data collected from http://chuangxin.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-
11/21/content_37294505.htm  
On the other hand, China still suffers from an inferior position in technological performance 
and is far away from standing at the technological frontier, which has long been dominated by 
Western countries. 
Technological innovation is driven by endogenous and exogenous determinants, which are 
embodied in its performance in the areas of research, production, and markets (Hall, 1994; 
Rosenberg, 1985). 
Regarding the research, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) (2018), in terms of the number of researchers per 1 million inhabitants, 
the U.S. had 4.3 thousand. The average level of G7 was 4.3 thousand. China only had 1.2 
thousand researchers per 1 million, which is far below the average level of G7. 
As for production, except those of high-technologies (space exploration, HSR), the core 
technologies in the MIC2025, ICT, industrial robots, and precision instruments are mainly 
dominated by western countries (see Table 7). Thereby, for a long time, China will still be 
dependent on foreign technologies. 
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Table 7 World top 10 companies in semiconductor, industrial robots, and precision 
instruments 
No. Semi-
conductor 
companies  
Origin Industrial 
robotic 
companies 
Origin Instrument 
companies 
Origin 
1 Intel the U.S. ABB Switzerland Thermo 
Fisher 
Scientific 
the U.S. 
2 Samsung the Republic 
of Korea 
Yaskawa Japan Shimadzu Japan 
3 Taiwan 
Semi- 
conductor 
Taiwan Kuka Germany Roche 
Diagnostics 
Switzerland 
4 Qualcomm the U.S. Fanuc Japan Agilent 
Technologies 
the U.S. 
5 Broadcom the U.S. Kawasaki Japan Danaher the U.S. 
6 SK Hynix the Republic 
of Korea 
Epson Japan Zeiss Group Germany 
7 Micron 
Technology 
the U.S. Stäubli Switzerland Bruker the U.S. 
8 Texas 
Instruments 
the U.S. Nachi 
Fujikoshi 
Japan Mettler-
Toledo 
International  
the U.S. 
9 Toshiba Japan Comau Italy Waters Corp. the U.S. 
10 Nxp Netherlands Adept 
Technology 
the U.S. PerkinElmer the U.S. 
Source: Compiled by the author with the data collected from  
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012216/worlds-top-10-semiconductor-companies-tsmintc.asp, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/19/content_22483256_10.htm, and  
https://cen.acs.org/business/instrumentation/Top-Instrument-Firms-2018/97/i9  
For market performance, Chinese companies still have a large gap for internationalization. For 
instance, the BAT, as Chinese outstanding emerging companies, has encountered inadequacy 
in competing with western ones in the global market. In Figure 20, the BAT has a relatively 
small presence in the global market.  
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Figure 20 Share of overseas income of BAT in 2012-2014 
Source: translated by the author with the data collected from 
https://www.ovdream.com/newsinfo/20151102104024f39fd0e38564affec.shtml 
Therefore, as MIC2025 is highly innovation-driven, it can help China upgrade its industrial 
system owing to the existing technological base. However, the distribution may cause the 
anxieties of technological unemployment (Folgieri, 2016) in the process of automation. On the 
other hand, considering that the technological base is concentrated in coastal areas, the plan’s 
performance may intensify the development gap between the coastal and inland areas.  
Besides the problems the plan poses, China needs to resolve environmental and social barriers 
to sustainable development. In this sense, it is not easy for China to escape the MIT.  
3. THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S RISE: TT OR CONTRIBUTING TO A MULTILATERAL 
WORLD ORDER? 
3.1.CHINA’S RISE 
In the past 40 years, China has increased its political power owing to its economic and 
technological progress. China has not only gained economic, military, and scientific capabilities 
but also exerted its influence worldwide through the distribution of those capacities. 
China has a sizeable economic capacity as its national wealth measured by GDP ranks second 
worldwide. Economic capacity cannot be equated with economic power (Boulding, 1990; Viotti, 
2001). Only through the distribution of capabilities can they exert influence then transform 
themselves into a world power (Ibid.). Foreign investment is the main instrument that China 
has employed to distribute its economic capacities to gain influence.  
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Since 2012, the reserve of Chinese foreign investment has entered the world top-three, close to 
Japan and the U.S. (MOFCOM, 2018). In 2015, the quantity of China’s OFDI firstly surpassed 
that of FDI and maintained this trend in 2016 and 2017 (Ibid.). 
Chinese OFDI, motivated by the “going global” strategy, has made Chinese companies gain 
access to resources, techniques, and brands that are absent in the internal market (MOFCOM 
site, n.d.). On the other hand, it has also contributed to the internationalization of Chinese 
products, services, techniques, and standards (Ibid.). Owing to these processes, Chinese 
companies obtain global competitiveness. 
Though Chinese investment has distributed itself worldwide, its most substantial proportion 
goes to Asia, with a percentage of 69.5% in 2017 (Ibid.). Naturally, the OFDI will help China 
build close economic ties with other Asian countries. 
Besides the distinct economic capacity, China also has an advanced military capacity. China 
has a significant defense expenditure guaranteed by economic growth, yet in a decreasing 
tendency (Huanqiu, 2019). In general expenditure, China was the second-largest military 
spender with a budget of U.S. $250 billion in 2018, compared to the U.S. $649 billion spending 
by the United States (see Figure 21). 
  
Figure 21 Top 15 military spenders in 2018 
Source: https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-
spending/military-expenditure 
With the expenditure and driving force of technological innovation, China has been 
modernizing its weaponry on land, water, air, and rocket force. It uses equipment of type 15 
 59 
 
tank, type 052D destroyer, J-20 fighter jet, and Dongfeng-26 medium and intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles (Xinhua, 2019). The equipment listed in the White Paper of the Chinese 
Defense Ministry has a combat ability and is of China’s independent innovation (Huanqiu, 
2019).   
As with a defensive position in national defense policy of never seeking hegemony, expansion, 
or sphere of influence, China distributes its military capacity by participating in multilateral 
treaties of anti-terrorism, arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. It also joins joint 
military exercises, U.N. peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian assistance events, 
and regional security dialogues and cooperation (Xinhua, 2019). 
China’s defensive policy and its participation in arms-control treaties cannot restrain its 
increasing military capacity. On the contrary, China’s technological progress will continue to 
improve its weaponry, as military technologies have visible effects in “enhancing capabilities 
and cost-effectiveness (in performing missions); outperforming potential adversaries; symbolic 
roles; and preserving or improving stability” (Greenwood, 1990, p. 417). 
The distribution of economic and military capacity constitutes China’s hard power as they can 
exert influence through payments (“carrots”) and threats (“sticks”) (Boulding, 1990; Nye, Jr., 
2004). However, hard power does have limitations in attaining its objectives, as coercion is not 
always successful (Nye, Jr., 2004). China’s scientific capacity obtained in the past development 
has a different way of distribution, namely in science diplomacy. 
On the one hand, China has conducted diplomacy for science, using diplomacy for “facilitating 
international science cooperation” (the Royal Society, 2010, p. 15). Presently, China has 
established technological relations with 156 countries and regions and signed 108 governmental 
scientific cooperation treaties (Li, Wang, T. T., Wang, Z. C., & Zhu, 2017). 
On the other hand, China has used more scientific collaboration to improve international 
relations. As science itself is a source of soft power, scientific cooperation can “smoothen the 
political relations” (Leijten, 2017, p. 1). China has sent more than 140 diplomatic officers on 
S&T affairs in 47 countries, joined more than 200 international S&T organizations, and set up 
more than 500 global science and technology cooperation bases (Li et al., 2017). 
3.2.CHINA’S RISE FOR THE WORLD ORDER: ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S PROPOSALS 
FOR THE ORDER 
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With its increasing power, China has launched various proposals both for Asia and the world 
in recent years. The country has done it in the name of building up a community of a shared 
future in Asia (Xinhua, 2019) and for humankind (Guo, 2018). 
Under the scheme of the Asian community with a shared future, China has proposed its new 
concept of Asian security. Specifically, Chinese President Xi in the Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in 2014 proposed a new concept of regional security 
cooperation architecture, namely, “a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable 
security strategy for Asia” (Xinhua, 2014, no page). The concept emphasizes the participation 
of every Asian country in security maintenance, that is, “security problems in Asia should be 
solved by Asians themselves through cooperation” (Ibid.). Moreover, it opposes military 
alliance and calls for equal security for every Asian country (Xinhua, 2014).  
However, Asian security architecture belongs to the world security order constructed by 
America and its allies after the Cold War. In this area, America has maintained military pre-
eminence and developed strategic allies with several Asian countries. Thus, it is not easy for 
China to substitute America to provide the public good in this area by promoting cooperation 
with a new security concept. 
Regarding the community of a shared future for humankind, in economic terms, China’s 
proposal is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), referring to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which were subsequently proposed by President Xi in 
September and October in 2013 (Belt and Road Portal, n.d.). 
On the Belt and Road Portal (n.d.), the Chinese government has positioned the BRI as an 
international cooperative platform and the global public good. The BRI routes attempt to 
connect China mainly with Central Asia and Europe.  
Though the BRI routes spread widely, China primarily considers the neighboring countries and 
regions to cooperate with (People’s Daily, 2019). Till present, 21 countries that surround China 
have signed the Memorandum of Understanding on BRI cooperation (Ibid.). The cooperation 
has largely increased trade flows between China with its surrounding countries. The value of 
import and export between China and 28 surrounding countries in 2018 has risen by 25% than 
that of 2012, surpassing the total value between China, America, and Europe (Ibid.). 
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In this sense, the BRI demonstrates the characteristics of regionalism and bilateralism. In other 
words, it focuses on Asia.  
Besides the economic proposal, China has launched its political solution for the world, namely, 
building up a new type of international relations, based on mutual respect, fairness, justice, and 
mutually beneficial cooperation (Guo, 2018). From China’s perspective, changing actual 
international relations in this direction is the only way to establish a community with a shared 
destiny, as the solution responds to the increasing demand to participate in the international 
politics of emerging powers (Ibid.). In this sense, the new relations will oppose a hegemonic 
hierarchy and elevate each country to equal participation. However, building up new relations 
will not lead to a new world order. Instead, it will contribute to the reform of the current world 
order under China’s leadership (People.cn, 2018).   
Though the order is not fixed and can be organized in different ways, the critical stakeholder 
will have a new bargain in order to renegotiate the authority of the order with the U.S. 
(Ikenberry, 2011). With respect to the Asian security architecture, China has various historical 
and territorial problems to resolve in the area, namely, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea 
issue, and territorial disputes with Japan and India. Thus, Asia’s security is crucial for China. 
On the other hand, since the end of WWII, America has kept its presence in Asia by developing 
various strategic allies. China’s increasing aspiration for new Asian security possibly collides 
with America’s interest in the area. In other words, China may have to renegotiate authority 
with the U.S. in Asia, most likely in the form of conflict or war.  
For China’s solution for the world, the BRI has developed a concentration on regionalism. It is 
doubtful that it can distribute worldwide and become a truly public good. Moreover, China’s 
notion of a new type of international relations is likely to oppose America’s hegemonic position. 
In this condition, China will also find itself negotiating with the U.S.  
Therefore, in terms of China’s rise and its proposals, China will probably have to renegotiate 
the authority of the world order with the U.S. and fall into the TT.  
3.3.CHINA’S RISE IN THE WORLD ORDER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JAPAN 
AND CHINA 
After knowing China’s rise and its proposals for the world, it is still necessary to analyze if 
China is a key stakeholder according to its rise in the current world order.  
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Similar to China, Japan is an important Asian country and was the second-largest economy in 
the 1970s owing to its “quiet diplomacy” (low-key diplomacy) (Potter & Sueo, 2003, p. 321) 
and concentration of inner economic development (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998). Japan’s 
reemergence increased the concern of the U.S. about the possibility of Japan becoming the 
number one economic power (Vogel, 1979, cit., Azumi, 1980). In other words, Japan 
challenged American hegemony.  
With the concern, the U.S. launched a trade conflict towards Japan and obtained “a tactical 
victory in the war with the 1985 Plaza Accord” (Hemmings, 2018). The result ultimately 
reduced Japan into a bubble economy and then into the Lost Decade. Even though Japan and 
the U.S. did not face power shifts and war due to their alliance, Japan still suffered huge and 
painful adjustments in their competition. 
Currently, China has substituted Japan and become the world’s second-largest economy, which 
has triggered America’s concern about China’s rise. Thus, it is meaningful to compare Japan 
and China from the aspect of their positions in the world order and their relations with the U.S. 
to analyze whether China challenges American hegemonic power. If China threatens American 
power, a power transition will be seen between the two countries; if this is not the case, the shift 
is not likely to happen.  
3.3.1. POSITIONS IN THE WORLD ORDER  
After WWII, the world was in a bipolar state. The hierarchy was marked by the ideological 
opposition between the communist and the capitalist camps, led by the Soviet Union and the 
U.S., respectively. As the two camps reached a balance of power, the world gained a ‘Cold War’ 
peace (Ikenberry, 2018). 
Within the capitalist camp, America was the leader. Thus, it led the other allies to build up a 
world order organized around “economic openness, multilateral institutions, security 
cooperation, and democratic solidarity” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 7). 
Economically, before ending the war, the allied countries led by the U.S. had begun making 
rules regarding the regulation of their commercial and financial relations. In 1944, they 
achieved the Bretton Woods Agreement and established an international monetary system with 
specific rules, institutions, and procedures. These accords directly contributed to the 
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establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
International Monetary Fund (Ikenberry, 2018). 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-led liberal multilateralism existed and spread 
outward (Ibid.). Thus, the world entered the World Order 1.0 (Haass, 2017), in which the U.S. 
was the principal provider of public goods (Nye, Jr., 2017). Those public goods included the 
management of rules and institutions, global security, the world economy, and liberal 
democracies (Ikenberry, 2018). 
Although Japan was defeated in WWII, it has participated in the order’s rule-making and 
defense, owing to its alliance with the U.S. It can be proved that the British and the French 
accepted Japan’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955 under 
U.S.’s pressure (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998). Also, Japan successfully transformed itself 
into an advanced industrial economy at the end of the 1950s and joined the OECD in 1964 
(Ashizawa, 2008). Through these steps, Japan has gradually been identified as “a sole member 
of the West in Asia” (Ibid., p.574). Thereby Japan, along with other western economies, became 
the defender of the order under the leadership of the U.S.  
Different from Japan, China is one of the emerging economies that is struggling to change the 
situation of technological laggards (Song, 2016). China formally joined the world economic 
order in 2001 when it was admitted to the WTO. Though China is a later follower, it has founded 
regional institutions with other emerging economies, for instance, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). From this 
perspective, China diverges from its status quo as a follower of the order and is becoming a 
challenger instead (Nye, Jr., 2017). 
3.3.2. RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. 
The Japan-U.S. relationship is based on their military alliance, yet the alliance has asymmetric 
features (Sakaguchi, 2009).  
With its defeat in WWII, Japan transformed its external policy from militarism into pacifism in 
the form of low-key diplomacy (Potter & Sueo, 2003) and made the Yoshida Doctrine with a 
focus on economic development (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998).  
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In the field of defense, Japan is dependent on collective security through its alliance with the 
U.S., which was marked by signing a security treaty with the U.S. in 1951 (Ohira, 1964). 
However, the two countries’ alliance is “an asymmetric relationship of things and people” 
(Sakaguchi, 2009, p. 29). In other words, Japan provided “things”, namely, “the supply of bases 
and contributing to the cost of stationing troops” (Ibid.), while the U.S. provided “people,” 
namely, “troops and the formulations of strategy” (Ibid.), for safeguarding the security of Japan 
and East Asia (Mathur, 2004). The asymmetric relationship has evolved with differences from 
the two parties about their defense arrangements (Stockwin, 1973). 
Besides the security guarantee, Japan also benefits from the relationship with access to “U.S. 
markets for industrial products, technologies, and investment” (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998, 
p. 176). Also, under America’s support, Japan joined the GATT in 1955 and the OECD in 1964, 
which guaranteed the entrance of Japanese products in the European market (Heginbotham & 
Samuels, 1998). 
Despite those advantageous conditions, Japan adhered to protectionism, making a series of 
nontariff barriers to limit foreign investment and imports (Lincoln, 1992, cit., Heginbotham & 
Samuels, 1998). Under these circumstances, Japan achieved rapid economic growth and 
became the world’s second-largest economy (measured by GDP) in 1968. 
America, as Japan’s largest trade partner (Stockwin, 1973), had a massive trade deficit with 
Japan. With military and economic advantages, America launched trading conflict towards 
Japan and finally obtained victory in a tactical way (Hemmings, 2018).   
Different from Japan, China, since its foundation in 1949, has stuck to an independent foreign 
policy of non-alignment. Since China and the U.S. normalized their foreign relations in 1979, 
the bilateral relations have kept basically stable (Yan & Gong, 2018), yet with a complex of 
cooperative and competitive issues (Young, 2015). 
In Deng Xiaoping’s period, China kept a low-key profile in international politics and centered 
on economic development (Yan & Gong, 2018). On the other hand, the U.S. took the 
containment strategy (Fuchs, 2019), focusing on confrontation with the Soviet Union. Under 
this background, the China-U.S. relations developed at their course of normalization. 
As with the end of the Cold War, the real superpower, America, shifted its containment doctrine 
to Clinton’s democratic enlargement (Fuchs, 2019), that is, “expanding the community of free-
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market democracies” (Foreign Policy’s editors, 2009, no page). The doctrine led to the military 
intervention on China’s issues, for instance, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996), 
America’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the Hainan Island 
Incident in 2001. Those incidents deteriorated the relations between the two countries. 
However, the occurrence of a terrorist attack in 2001 directly shifted America’s foreign policy 
from enlargement to the global war on terrorism (Fuchs, 2019). America’s strategic shift made 
the Chinese government define the first two decades of the twenty-first century as a period of 
strategic opportunity for its development (Jiang, 2006, cit., Yan & Gong, 2018). Later, China 
joined the American-led nuclear nonproliferation activity and participated in the six-party talks 
on the North Korean nuclear issues (Tao, 2019). These actions contributed to form stable and 
positive relations between the two countries. 
Under this background, the China-U.S. relations have developed through trading 
communication and cooperation on international issues. According to the data from MOFCOM 
(2007), in 2006, America became China’s second-largest trading partner and the largest 
exporting market, while China surpassed Mexico and became America’s second-largest trading 
partner and the fourth-largest exporting market. According to Figure 22, bilateral trading has 
increased faster than global trading from 2007 to 2014.  
 
Figure 22 World trade average annual growth rate from 2007 to 2014 
Source: translated by the author with the figure retrieved from  
www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2016-01/15/content_8536715.htm 
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Also, the two countries have cooperated on energy and the environment since the period of 
George W. Bush’s administration. The cooperation led to the assignment of the U.S.-China 
Framework for the Ten-Year Cooperation on Energy and Environment in 2008 (Tao, 2019). 
With rapid economic growth, China has gradually changed its “low-key” profile started in the 
Deng Xiaoping period (Yan & Gong, 2018) into a more proactive posture in global politics 
(Zhang, 2010). Namely, under the leadership of Xi Jinping in 2012, China put forward a “major 
country” diplomacy (great power diplomacy) and attempted to build up a community with a 
shared future for humankind (People.cn, 2017). 
Though during the Obama administration, America attempted to rebalance its Asia strategy, 
namely, the “Pivot to Asia,” it maintained cooperative relations with China on climate change, 
trade, military exchanges, and other issues (Young, 2015). 
However, with the ascension of Donald Trump in 2017, America changed to the America First 
approach (Fuchs, 2019). Under this approach, America defined China as a revisionist country16 
and a strategic competitor17. On trading terms, the Trump administration launched a trade 
conflict with China that lasts until the present. 
The shift in the American policy towards China has demonstrated that the stability in the China-
US relationship is “tactical rather than strategic” (Yuan, 2009, p. 101). Further, the potential 
risks and problems will be likely to bring the relations into instability, namely, differences of 
social system and ideologies, the unsolved Taiwan issue, and “growing collisions between 
geopolitics and geo-economics” (Ibid.) between the status quo hegemon and the rising power 
(Yuan, 2009).  
Therefore, in the world order, China’s position does not pose threats to America’s leading 
position. Also, the two countries have developed interconnected economic relations. From the 
development of their bilateral relations, they can find tactical ways to maintain stable relations. 
However, from China’s perspective, it tends to reform the regional and global order for its own 
sake. China tends to change its status quo and becomes an order challenger. Besides, states are 
usually more cooperative in the sphere of the economy than security (Gill & Law, 1988). Thus, 
 
16 In the National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued by the White House on December 
2017), the U.S. defined China as a revisionist power.  
17 In the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America issued in 2018, the U.S. addressed China as 
“Great Power Competitor”. 
 67 
 
it is not easy for the two countries to cooperate on security relations, which are more affected 
by “questions of history and national identity” (Ibid., p. 35). In the Asia-Pacific area, China’s 
interests overlap with the U.S. on multiple territorial issues (Taiwan and Diaoyu Island). 
Moreover, China proposes to enhance its presence in Asia with a more powerful identity. In 
this sense, China and the U.S. may fall into the TT concerning security issues in the region. 
4. ANALYSIS WITH THE DATA FROM SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
JUSTIFICATION OF SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
The semi-structured interview is one of the two main types of interviews in qualitative research 
(Bryman, 2012). Qualitative interviewing will emphasize “the interviewee’s point of view” 
(Ibid., p. 470). As it is more flexible than quantitative interviewing (structured interview), it 
allows interviewer to “follow up interviewees’ replies and (…) vary the order and even the 
wording of questions” to obtain “rich, detailed answers” (Ibid.).  
In our research design, after obtaining a quantitative result, we need to collect and use 
qualitative data to analyze the results in a detailed way.  
In the quantitative research, we concluded that MIC2025 has a dual instrumental function in 
China’s development and rise to power. However, technological innovation will cause 
unemployment anxiety and intensify the development gap between Chinese coastal and inland 
regions. Moreover, China itself has many problems in terms of environmental protection, social 
justice, and IP protection, which make sustainable development and transformation more 
difficult to achieve. Regarding China’s rise, China is not powerful enough to threaten America’s 
leading position in the world order. However, China may protect its national security in the 
Asia-Pacific area and could face conflicts with the U.S. in the process.  
However, quantitative research lacks information about the newest tendency of MIC2025 since 
it was launched in 2015 and original ideas about the prospect of China’s rise. To resolve these 
insufficiencies, we have invited two interviewees, namely, one official from China’s Embassy 
in Portugal and one reporter from China Daily. Both of the interviewees are familiar with 
China’s technological issues and are interested in China’s rise in world politics.  
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QUESTION DESIGN 
Considering the flexible process of qualitative research, the question list for semi-structured 
interviews serves as an “interview guide” that allows the interviewees to have “a great deal of 
leeway in how to reply” (Bryman, 2012, p. 471). Also, in the process, the questions are not 
limited in the guide and can be added, “as the interviewer picks up on things said by 
interviewees” (Ibid.).  
To obtain the original ideas and newest tendency about MIC2025, China’s development, and 
China’s rise, we have designed two groups of questions according to the interviewees’ expertise. 
➢ Question themes for the Chinese official, 
⚫ MIC2025 and China’s development trajectory transference; 
⚫ MIC2025 and China’s soft power; 
⚫ China’s rise and relations with the U.S.; 
⚫ China’s position in the world order. 
➢ Question themes for the Chinese reporter, 
⚫ MIC2025 development, technological unemployment, and China’s development 
transformation; 
⚫ China’s risk of dropping in the MIT and the Chinese government’s reactions; 
⚫ China’s technological independence increased by MIC2025 and the possibilities of world 
technological split; 
⚫ Technological cold war and possibilities of TT between China and the U.S.; 
⚫ MIC2025 and China’s soft power; 
⚫ China’s IP protection situation. 
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INTERVIEW FORMS 
The interview with the Chinese official (Wang L.) was in person and held in the embassy in 
Portugal. The interview was transcribed according to the notes made by the interviewer, as the 
interview was not allowed to be recorded. 
The second interview with the reporter (requesting to be anonymous) was via telephone. With 
prior recording permission, the interview was transcribed according to the record. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
According to the interviews, both the interviewees are favorable for China’s prospective 
development and the future of China’s rise. Namely, China can shift from traditional 
development patterns to an innovative-driven pattern under the current policies and plans. 
Alternatively, owing to the interconnected economic relations among global economies, China 
and America can find ways to maintain cooperation and coexist peacefully not only in the Asia-
Pacific area but also worldwide.  
First of all, China’s economic slowdown does not indicate that it will lead China into the MIT; 
instead, it represents an economic transition shifting “from high-speed growth to medium- and 
high-speed growth; from extensive growth to high-quality development” (interview, Wang, 
2019). During the transition, China has been transferring its technological trajectory by using 
artificial intelligence (AI) and 5G and distributing policies of innovative entrepreneurship 
(Ibid.).  
Further, in the process of distributing new technologies, China will temporarily encounter 
unemployment (interview, reporter, 2019). In reality, the distribution will help improve the 
workers’ technical capacity (Ibid.). For instance, Guangdong and Zhejiang are two Chinese 
coastal provinces that are in the lead in distributing robotic technologies. Besides replacing 
some workers with robots, they have been equipping their workers with the know-how to 
operate the robots (Ibid.).  
Moreover, new jobs will emerge (Ibid.). In the AI industry, data annotation requires a lot of 
labor to annotate the images and voices that will form the data for AI’s processing (Ibid.).  
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The transfer of technological trajectory can effectively solve China’s development disparity 
problem (Ibid.). According to the reporter from China Daily (2019), China has initiated an 
industrial transfer from coastal regions to interior areas. For instance, Wuhan (a central city) 
has become one of the receptors of the manufacturing system of computers, communication, 
and consumer electronics (3C) from the southeast areas; Hefei (another central city) has become 
an essential base for household appliance manufactures. Thus, the transfer inward can, to some 
extent, narrow the development gap between the coastal areas and interior ones (Ibid.).  
China’s industrial transfer does not exclude foreign enterprises (Ibid.). The company Samsung 
(a South Korean MNC) has participated in the process and set its semiconductor factory in 
Xi’an (a west city) (Ibid.). 
Concerning independent innovation, another strategic aim of MIC2025, China will fasten its 
pace in the domestication of core technologies after the occurrence of Huawei’s sudden block 
caused by the use of its chip and operating system technologies of the U.S. (Ibid.). 
As core technologies of commercial chips are dominated by the U.S. and the chip industries are 
highly globalized, China will inevitably continue to depend on American technologies for at 
least two or three decades (Ibid.).  
In this condition, to gain technology competitiveness, China needs to stand at the technological 
frontier during the fourth industrial revolution. Therefore, China has been an essential catalyst 
in setting up a 5G standard. Also, nearly all Chinese ICT companies, both SOEs and private 
ones, have participated in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) to negotiate with 
foreign companies for uniform standards of 5G (Ibid.).  
Besides 5G standards, China attempts to have independent technologies in the IoT era (Ibid.). 
Chinese tech companies like Huawei and Baidu have started to develop a platform with their 
technologies for IoT usage (Ibid.).   
However, China still needs a “very long” time to build an independent technological ecosystem 
and will continue to depend on American technologies (Ibid.). In this sense, the technological 
cold war will hardly occur between China and the U.S.  
Yet, China’s consciousness of IP protection is growing stronger (Ibid.), which will help China 
gain technological competitiveness.  
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MIC2025 will not only help China form technical competitiveness but could also improve its 
attractiveness (Ibid.). For instance, the subsidy in the plan covers both domestic and foreign 
companies. The reporter gave an example of a new energy automobile (NEA) of which 
consumers can obtain subsidy by purchasing an NEA, whether in Chinese brands or foreign 
brands. Thus, MIC2025 can attract MNCs of new energy.  
According to Wang (interview, 2019), the notion of TT was born in an isolated world. In the 
current world, economies are tightly interconnected by industrial and technological chains. 
Undoubtedly, countries need competition. The notion is with a Cold-War mind, resulting in a 
“lose-lose” game. With reference to President Xi, Wang (Ibid.) agrees that “the Pacific Ocean 
is big enough to accommodate China and the United States.” That is to say, the two countries 
can find common interests in the Asia-Pacific area and coexist with each other peacefully.   
In the world order, China tends to be a responsible big country. On the one hand, China will 
stick to its path and become “more and more open.” (Ibid.). On the other hand, China will 
contribute its force to maintain globalization. The BRI is a public good that China provides for 
upgrading globalization (interview, Wang, 2019). 
SYNTHESIS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
Regarding China’s prospective development, the interviewees maintain a realist position that 
China will upgrade the industrial system and obtain more economic power. This perspective 
accords with the notion of strategic industries in the political economy (Gill & Law, 1988). 
These industries are always crucial for a nation’s security because they decrease dependence 
on other countries (Ibid.). The interviews demonstrate that China is in the process of 
domesticating core technologies and is being driven not only by economic benefits but also 
economic security. 
On the contrary, the interviewees hold a liberal perspective that China can fulfill a peaceful rise 
owing to the economic interdependence in the world. In the liberal paradigm, international 
cooperation and integration can contribute to forming interdependence among economies 
(Labarre, 2007). The interdependence helps nations build up rational positivism (Maoz, 2009), 
and thus, it will “deter the likelihood of war” (Lee, 2018, p. 215). However, strategically 
interdependent states have increased security to deter aggression and then escape the conflicts 
(Kegley & Raymond, 1982, cit., Maoz, 2009). Meanwhile, economically interdependent states 
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are more likely to have conflicts with an increased frequency because the occasions for conflict 
multiply in interdependent economies (Lee, 2018). The Japan-U.S. and China-U.S. trade 
conflicts have proven this point. The conflicts are largely due to the U.S.’s “negative 
expectations on the future trade environment” (Lee, 2018, p. 215). In this sense, it is far from 
enough for China to use economic ties to escape conflicts with the U.S., let alone its conflict 
with the U.S. at this moment. Notwithstanding existing possibilities of resuming stable relations 
through economic cooperation, it still complicates the security relations. Security cooperation 
is more difficult than economic cooperation, and thus, security conflicts will more likely lead 
to the prisoners’ dilemma (Gill & Law, 1988).  
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CONCLUSION 
MIC2025 is China’s strategic plan for both industrial upgrading and rising in the world order. 
The dual instrumental function of MIC2025 will not only affect China’s prospective 
development but also influence the world order.  
To respond to the research question of that, is MIC2025 an instrument for China’s development 
strategy to enhance its position in the world order, we have accomplished the analysis through 
three parts, namely, the dual instrumental function of MIC2025, China’s prospective 
development, and the future of China’s rise. In the end, we have found that MIC2025 is highly 
driven by technological innovation and is especially closely related to core technologies of the 
fourth industrial revolution, ICT. Also, MIC2025 is crucial for the China Dream of full 
modernization by standing at the technological frontier. Then, concerning China’s development, 
we have found that China’s traditional development model has been exhausting its effectiveness; 
therefore, China needs to shift its trajectory, yet the shift will not be easy. China still stands far 
away from the technological frontier, though it has built up a specific technological 
infrastructure. Last, regarding China’s rise, we have found that China has increased its hard and 
soft power, but it cannot threaten America’s dominant position in the world order. In addition, 
China’s proposals, whether for Asia or the world, are unlikely to become public good soon. 
Therefore, MIC2025 has limited effectiveness as an instrument for China’s development and 
rising in the world order. 
Concerning the first hypothesis that MIC2025 can help China escape MIT and maintain 
sustainable development, we can say that China’s technological base can be helpful for its 
MIC2025 goals yet will have limited effects considering the distance from the technological 
frontier. Though China can maintain economic growth, it cannot be guaranteed to achieve 
sustainable development, which requires a combination of economic vitality, environmental 
sustainability, and social progress. Therefore, China needs to improve its environmental 
management capacity and enhance social justice efforts. In this sense, it is not clear that China 
can escape the MIT and maintain sustainable development. 
Regarding the second hypothesis that China, with the strength enhanced by the innovation plan, 
will escape the TT and contribute to the reinforcement of a multilateral world order, we can 
say that China will not drop in the TT but doubtfully reinforce a multilateral world order. 
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Specifically, China is not powerful enough to challenge America’s position. Development 
issues are still priority for the country. Thus, China will intentionally escape the trap. However, 
in Asia, China’s interests overlap with America’s. If China continues to aspire for more 
Lebensraum openly, the country may face a conflict with the U.S. In this condition, China’s 
proposals for the world are more likely to enhance its position in Asia. Alternatively, China 
attempts to become an absolute Asia power by distributing its proposals mainly in this area. 
Thereby, China will reform the Asia order and likely have a conflict with the U.S. in Asia, not 
excluding other Asian powers (India and Japan).   
Therefore, we can finally conclude that MIC2025 is crucial for China’s catching up with the 
developed countries, as it is designed to build up China’s strategic industries and then help 
China reduce dependence on foreign core technologies. However, China still needs foreign 
technologies in the coming decades. Thus, China will keep attracting FDI and maintain its 
cooperation with other economies.  
MIC2025 also demonstrates China’s shift in both technical paradigm and development 
trajectory. China can employ the plan to accomplish industrial upgrading and maintain 
economic growth but at a reduced rate. However, China cannot utilize the plan to achieve 
sustainable development without consideration of environmental sustainability, social justice, 
IP protection, and motivation of entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, in the process of catching up, China may prefer to escape the TT and focus 
on economic development. However, in Asia, with consideration of national security, China 
may not escape conflicts with the U.S. to defend its national interests. For China, reforming 
Asian order is more important than reforming the world order. From this perspective, China’s 
proposals will likely build up its superior position in Asia. 
The study has contributed insight into the analysis of the relations among industrial policy, 
development, and world order under the discipline of political economy in international 
relations. Specifically, the study has explored and built upon a theoretical structure of 
technological innovation, development, and power. Furthermore, to perform high-quality 
research, it involves mixed methods concerning the quantitative approach of first-hand 
materials and secondary analysis, and a qualitative approach of semi-structured interviews. The 
bibliography is distributed multilingually. Based on these conditions, the study has conducted 
relatively thorough research on China’s industrial policy as well as its influence on China’s 
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development and rise in the world order. Thereby, it can serve as a meaningful academic 
attempt to improve the acknowledgment of China in international politics. 
However, as the study concerns multiple aspects, it has encountered inadequacy in some 
analyses due to the space limitation. In addition, semi-structured interviews only involve two 
Chinese interviewees, without opinions from other countries. In this sense, the analyses of the 
interviews become partial. Thus, these inadequacies can be left for other studies to improve 
upon. 
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APPENDIX A 
Semi-structured interview with Mr. Wang Lei (First Secretary and Vice-Director of Political Section 
(in technological issues) of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Portugal) – in the 
Embassy – 24 July 2019  
1. Do you think that the manufacturing strategy motivated by technological innovation can 
promote the transfer of China’s development path and enable China to achieve sustainable 
economic development under the new normal? Besides, how will this path of development 
be transferred?  
I do not agree with the statement of the “economic downturn.” I think that China’s economy 
has been shifted from high-speed growth to medium- and high-speed growth; from extensive 
growth to high-quality development. It is inevitable that China’s economic development will 
enter a new normal. Due to the decline of China’s population and resources, the extensive 
growth model of the past has been unacceptable. 
Now China’s development is shifting towards the development model advocated by President 
Xi Jinping, that is, adhering to the development concept of innovation, coordination, green, 
openness, and sharing. Openness is to continue to adhere to reform and opening-up policy, and 
sharing is to advocate social fairness and justice.  
In current China, it occurs not only the transfer of technological paths, like artificial intelligence 
and 5G but what is more the reform of the dual-innovation system of “mass entrepreneurship 
and innovation” (to encourage people to do business creatively and drive innovation). I have 
confidence in China’s development. 
2. How do you feel that China will use the manufacturing strategy driven by technological 
innovation to enhance its attractiveness to other countries and regions, thus enhancing 
China’s soft power? 
First of all, I want to say that the process from industrial upgrading to economic development 
is not that smooth and will encounter various problems to be resolved. A successful industrial 
upgrade will generate soft power. For example, China has obtained various achievements in 
large-scale technologies, Beidou Navigation Satellite System, high-speed rail, 5G, especially 
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the Chang’e 4’s landing on the far side of the Moon, which is the first time in human history 
and caused a great interest of my Portuguese friends. 
3. On July 12, 2019, China and Portugal set up a Star Lab on space technology advanced 
research. This can be a case of demonstrating China’s soft power in a foreign country? 
This lab is an implementation of President’s last visit in Portugal, and also a fruit of nearly 16-
years’ preparations of our Embassy in Portugal. The laboratory aims to strengthen cooperation 
between the two countries in high technology, especially in satellite exploration, to help 
Portugal and also to serve as a driving force for bilateral cooperation. The laboratory is a joint 
initiative of small and medium satellite innovation institutes, universities, and research 
institutes. 
The Chinese government will set up more and more joint laboratories. At the same time, we 
will promote the use of China’s industrialization funds for companies in Portugal. 
4. Do you agree with the notion of Thucydides Trap? If there is no war between China and the 
U.S., will there still occur a competition with the nature of Thucydides Trap, namely, zero-
sum game? Can we say that the current Sino-American trade war is classified as such 
competition? 
I do not agree with the saying of “Thucydides Trap.” This statement was originated more than 
2,000 years ago, in an isolated world. Today we are in a globalized world; various chains of 
technology and manufacturing have brought the nations together. I do not agree with this 
statement, but I think competition among countries is necessary. 
China must adhere to a high-quality development approach, like “take your own path, no matter 
what others say.” This is not only responsible for our own country and our people, but also 
responsible for all humankind. If China continues to adhere to its previous extensive 
development method, it will not conform to the interests of the entire human race. 
Today, the United States adheres to a mentality of the Cold War and believes that there must 
be a war between the defending country and the rising one. This kind of zero-sum game is a 
lose-lose game. While, China adheres to a win-win foreign policy, just like President Xi Jinping 
said, “the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate China and the United States.” 
5. Last month, the U.S. launched a New Prosper Africa Initiative and Access Africa Initiative, 
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tending to occupy more African markets and to promote its ICT. What do you think the 
Chinese government and companies in Africa should do? 
Chinese companies have established a deep foundation in Africa. China and African countries 
have also developed a profound relationship. The Chinese government will not interfere with 
the development of Chinese companies in Africa. Chinese companies undergo legitimate 
competition in the African market. Those Chinese companies rooted in Africa all have carried 
out successful innovation of localization. These companies are not only represented by big 
companies like Huawei or ZTE, but what is more by relatively small companies, Transsion (a 
company from Shenzhen with a focus on the terminal of mobile communication). We welcome 
the competition. 
6. How does China act as a big country? Also, how does China position itself in the current 
order? 
Do well our internal things. The great achievements China has made since the reform and 
opening-up have proved that China has chosen the right road and adhered to the correct path.  
In the past few decades, China has obtained its achievements, which cost European and 
American countries for nearly 200 years. China has achieved poverty eradication of 700 million 
people and made nearly 1.4 billion people have enough food and clothing.  
China will adhere to the “four self-confidence” (confidence in the path, theory, system, and 
culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics). China will be more open and continue to 
embrace the world. 
Although China is the world’s second-largest economy, China’s per capita GDP only occupies 
one-sixth of that of the U.S., so China is still a developing country. 
China will assume the responsibility of being a big country and will not evade it. China's BRI 
is to carry out the “five-pronged approach” (promoting policy coordination, road connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, currency convertibility, and strengthened people-to-people ties). Till now, 
with more than 140 countries participating in the BRI, it can be proved that the initiative meets 
their interests.  
The world order based on globalization cannot be split artificially. 
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China will be a responsible big country, to promote globalization, and to become more and 
more open, benefiting the world.    
7. Can we say that the BRI is China’s initiative supplementary to globalization, which gives 
benefit to the marginal countries? 
BRI is a public product provided by China. I think it is an upgrade to globalization. China insists 
on the principle of “Seeking Common Ground While Shelving Differences.” The facts will 
prove that countries can be benefited from participation. 
8. Will the U.S. join the BRI in the future? 
The Cold War mentality held by the U.S. tends to help it shift its domestic contradictions 
outward in order to obtain more votes. According to the chief interpreter of American ex-
President Nixon and American diplomat, Chas W. Freeman, Jr., it is the U.S. itself that made 
China become its enemy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
 
APPENDIX B 
Semi-structured interview with one reporter (responsible for following China’s technological 
news) for technological issues from China Daily – telephone interview – 29 August 2019 
1. “Made in China 2025” aims to help China’s economic transformation through high 
technology. Will it lead to massive unemployment in the low-tech industry? Thereby it will 
cause an imbalance of China’s development and increase the difficulty of China's 
transformation? 
There will be some impact in the short term, but in the long run, it will not occur much 
unemployment. There are two trends. First of all, China’s population is aging, the labor force 
is decreasing year by year, and the cost of employing people is getting higher and higher. For 
example, in the past few years, there has been a lack of labors in China’s coastal areas. These 
enterprises cannot find people. 
There are two trends now, and the distribution of high technology may lead to the loss of low-
skilled personnel. China’s labor-intensive industries are lacking. The two trends are parallel. I 
have asked many companies, and they said that within ten years, labor costs would double or 
triple, so the cost of employing people is very high. 
Second, according to the experience of the technology companies I interviewed, Guangdong 
and Zhejiang are the two provinces with the most forceful implementation of robotics programs 
in China (both governments and enterprises are involved). They will replace some of the labor 
with industrial robots and collaborative robots. Besides, in some labor-intensive industries, they 
use mechanics through low-tech training workers for the mid-tech operation of robots. The cost 
is not that high. For example, the 3C (computer, communication, and consumer electronics) 
production line uses more and more robots. Workers are familiar with the assembly line 
business, and the company trains these workers to control the robots. This cost is not very high. 
The model can be distributed. The labor costs saved by the company in two or three years can 
offset the cost of using robots (purchasing costs and training labor costs). 
The employment-population in these two years may be somewhat volatile, but in the long run, 
the impact is relatively small. 
2. The long-term impact is relatively small, referring to not a lot of unemployment, right?  
 97 
 
Yes, there will not be much unemployment. There will be more reemployment actually. The 
production of AI will bring new jobs. For example, in the AI industry, there is a labor-intensive 
work called “data annotation.” That is, the machine needs to recognize visual images and 
sounds. In the early stage, it takes many human resources to mark the images and sounds, and 
then form the basic data so that the machine can recognize the data. This kind of work is labor-
intensive and has emerged in the last two years. That is to say, new technologies will also 
produce labor-intensive jobs. 
Due to the high labor costs, the trend of lack of labor has reappeared. The two trends are parallel. 
3. How do Guangdong and Zhejiang update their technology and update their robots? 
The local governments give a small subsidy as an incentive policy. However, the manufacturing 
industry itself has significant demand. So, I feel that the promotion is relatively smooth. (For 
example, Zhejiang’s “machine substitution with robots” plan). For six consecutive years, China 
has become the world’s largest robot market. The quantity of robots deployed in China is the 
largest in the world. Although this rate has dropped this year, in the long run, the trend will 
continue. 
4. The second question is that since the reform and opening-up, China’s rapid development 
has not only brought about development imbalances, but also environmental problems. 
Moreover, China’s birth rate has decreased in recent years, and the population has become 
aging. China has the risk of entering the middle-income trap. How do you think China 
should escape this risk? 
In 2018, China’s per capita GDP reached 9,000 US dollars, and it has entered 10,000 US dollars. 
“Made in China 2025”, now is called the Manufacturing Power Plan. A big part of this plan is 
about industrial upgrading. 
The middle-income trap will result in social disparity, stagnant industrial development, and 
uncoordinated regional development. However, the state has adopted many policies to solve 
these problems, including industrial upgrading. China Manufacturing 2025 is an important 
promoter. 
The experts that I have interviewed have a view that because China is such big, its territorial 
area and its development between regions are naturally not coordinated. In this sense, multiple 
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industrial transfers can be completed within the country. For example, at the earliest time, the 
power plants were all located in the southeast coastal areas. However, in recent years, it has 
occurred industry transfer. The central city of Hefei has now become one of the largest home 
appliance manufacturing bases in China. Wuhan (another central city) is also known as an 
important 3C manufacturing base. These industries have been transferred from the southeast 
coast to the central city. It can not only help resolve the problem of development disparity and 
urbanization.  
At the same time, after the transfer, the industrial upgrading of the southeast coast will also 
become fast. The Southeast Coast will have more energy and financial support to develop high 
technology, such as AI. Also, the state has made various polices to coordinate regional 
development, for instance, the Yangtze River Delta, Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater 
Bay Area. These are the policies adopted by the state to avoid falling into the trap. 
5. In the second question, you mentioned that the state has specific policies to promote 
balanced development. Is China going to be an inward-looking economy, no longer relying 
on foreign consumer markets, and will protect its market like the U.S. now? Is it possible 
to fall into protectionism?  
I feel that regional coordination (policy) is not carried out on a closed premise. China's regional 
coordination (process) also has many foreign companies involved, including industrial transfer. 
For example, Samsung has a large semiconductor factory in Xi’an (western city). This shows 
that foreign companies are also involved in this process. The domestic market is vast and can 
be transferred in this way. However, this does not mean that China is exclusive. It welcomes 
foreign companies. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology also welcomes all 
foreign companies to invest in China and will build a fair environment for foreign companies. 
Based on the current Sino-US trade environment, there may be measures to stimulate 
consumption within the country. Yesterday (August 28, 2019), the State Council issued a 
document to promote internal consumption. However, even in such an environment, the 
government still insists on internationalization and adheres to global cooperation. Especially 
when the relationship with the United States is tense, we have closer relations with countries 
such as Europe, Japan, and Australia. I feel that the country still attaches great importance to 
internationalization and global cooperation. 
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6. In the 2018 ZTE incident, the United States sanctioned ZTE and later reconciled. ZTE will 
continue to maintain cooperation with the United States? Alternatively, turn to independent 
research and development chips? 
ZTE’s own ability to develop chips is particularly limited. Semiconductor (involving one) a 
super-globalized industrial chain. ZTE cannot now wholly rely on itself; neither can Huawei. 
The IP used by Huawei’s HiSilicon chips is based on the ARM framework. ARM is a British 
chip design company. Many of ARM’s technologies are developed in the United States. Now, 
the Chinese military has its R&D chips. However, in China’s civilian market, all commercial 
chips cannot entirely shed their reliance on American technology. This is impossible. It is 
necessary that we need American technology now. After the ZTE incident, the domestic 
producer has increased their intention of domestication of chip technology. This is not 
something that Chinese companies take the initiative to choose. This is because the United 
States has taken the most closed approach, directly cutting off technology.  
Last year’s ZTE incident and the current Huawei incident, both have an impact on the entire 
Chinese technology industry. In addition to Huawei, many other mobile phone manufacturers, 
including AI companies, have anxiety over Sino-US trade issues. As many key technologies 
are developed by Google, including Google’s APPs, YouTube, Google maps to which 
Huawei’s latest mobile phones are not available overseas.  
Therefore, domestication is not an active choice for Chinese companies. If open-source 
technology and American technology are available, providing them with a good technical 
framework, and then we (mobile phone manufacturers) can make the applications in a fast and 
profitable way. They are willing to do this (choose this model). However, this incident (Huawei) 
made them feel that it is impossible to continue this way (continue this model). At the very least, 
they must have a plan B. 
It may take decades to achieve domestication. Whatever, the intention is getting stronger. 
7. So now China is forced to choose such a path. My third problem is that after 20 or 30 years, 
China has a plan B and has its vital technology of ICT. Will the world occur a split of 
technical standards in the world? 
This depends on the situation. Different industries have different ways of setting standards. 
Even in this context, the communication industry, according to my acknowledgment, is now a 
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global standard. The 5G standard is unified and is promoted by the global communications 
industry. There is an organization called 3GPP, which is dedicated to the development of this 
industry standard. 
8. Which countries does this 3GPP consist of? 
It is not an international organization. It is not made up of the state. It is made up of enterprises. 
Communications companies, including China, the United States, and Europe are all in this 
organization. 
This standard (5G) is a globally unified standard, except for who has a greater discourse power 
in this standard. This year, Chinese companies have higher discourse power in the 5G standard, 
including Huawei and Mobile. They all led the process of standard-setting.   
9. Without ZTE? 
ZTE is also there. There are Huawei, ZTE, three major mobile operators, VIVO, OPPO, and 
Xiaomi; Apple, Qualcomm from the U.S.; Ericsson from Europe; Vodafone of UK; and the 
operators in Japan. It is these companies that have been discussing the 5G standards. So 5G is 
a standard for global unification. This is also what the Chinese government has been promoting, 
even in a stressful environment. That is, even the United States was already hostile to Huawei, 
China’s primary goal was to ensure that Chinese companies’ presence in the 3GPP organization 
was not much affected and then to promote globally unified standards. 
The advantage of the unified standard is that the cost of laying a 5G network will be lower.  So, 
this thing (standard) is driven by commercial profit. So, these companies are more willing to 
have a globally unified standard.  
Therefore, the possibility of standard splitting slight. This is the case in the communications 
industry.  
However, the underlying infrastructure may appear two sets later. In the IoT era, Huawei's 
Hongmeng (operating system) will be the next operating system for the future. It means that 
Chinese mobile phone manufacturers will not rely entirely on Android. The Hongmeng 
operating system framework is different from Android. In the IoT era, all things can be 
connected to the network. In this condition, an operating system is necessary to control these 
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things. At that time, Chinese manufacturers may not be willing to use the American operating 
system. 
Moreover, Huawei has started building its AI platform (ModelArts). Google’s (AI platform) 
name is TensorFlow. Baidu has developed PaddlePaddle (Baidu Deep Learning Platform), 
which is Baidu’s own original AI computing framework. Huawei has also developed the 
MindSpore computing framework. Therefore, Chinese manufacturers are slowly developing 
independently, one is to avoid similar incidents (ZTE and Huawei incidents) in the future, and 
the other is that Chinese manufacturers are becoming more mature and financially strong. 
Besides, the operating system is the most profitable. Therefore, Chinese companies are also 
willing to operate independently. Guo Taiming (an entrepreneur from Taiwan) once said that 
there would likely be “one technology and two systems,” one from China and the other form 
the U.S. This is possible.  
However, Chinese companies need a very long time to develop a complete ecosystem of the 
operating system. It may take decades. This is not to say that it can happen in the short term. 
Therefore, some media have heatedly discussed the term “Tech Cold War.” 
10. Do you agree with the “Tech Cold War”? 
I don’t think that we have reached the point. Now, Chinese companies are dependent on 
American technology. China can’t be independent suddenly. If the US government continues 
to sanctions Chinese companies, Chinese companies will accelerate its pace of independently 
developing even forcedly. In reality, this is a tough thing, a very difficult thing, with a high risk 
of failing. So, there is a possibility we are in the trend of going towards the so-called “Tech 
Cold War.” 
11. Will this so-called “Tech Cold War” lead to the outbreak of the hot war between China and 
the U.S.? The Thucydides Trap? 
I don’t think so. I don’t think it will happen at this age. Because the trade interdependence 
between China and the United States is so high, it is impossible to go to war directly. I think 
the possibility of having a war is particularly low. 
12. Is there a possibility of a regional conflict? 
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Regional conflicts may be in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea. However, the possibilities 
are not particularly high. There may be some demonstrations. 
13. Will “Made in China 2025” enhance China’s soft power? 
This also depends on two aspects. The subsidies in China’s manufacturing 2025 are not known 
to domestic companies but also overseas companies. For example, subsidies for new energy 
vehicles are subsidized to consumers. In other words, regardless of whether Chinese consumers 
buy new energy vehicles from China or Tesla, new energy vehicles from the U.S., they all enjoy 
subsidies. Therefore, Tesla sells in China and enjoys the subsidy of China. Therefore, the 
manufacturing plan will not only help China’s industrial upgrading but also help China’s 
consumption upgrading. In this sense, it will be attractive for foreign companies. According to 
the foreign companies I have interviewed, many companies expressed their willingness to join 
the manufacturing program, including SAP in Germany, Ericsson, and Microsoft. They all 
support the plan. 
Most of the MIC2025 are imitated after the U.S. “Advanced Manufacturing Partnership project” 
in 2011. 
14. Wasn’t it the imitated after German Industry 4.0? 
Germany’s Industry 4.0 is also imitated and combined with the American plan. Also, in the U.S. 
plan, it is written clearly that the U.S. government will invest 500 million US dollars, with the 
nature of subsidies, to encourage enterprises to participate while China’s subsidy policy is a 
support policy.  
In MIC2025, there is an innovative manufacturing plan which replicates the U.S. Advanced 
Manufacturing Partnership Project. According to an export I have interviewed, the incentive 
policy and means of MIC2025 are similar to the U.S. plan. Therefore, the U.S. government 
often says that MIC2025 has spoiled up subsidies and disrupted the markets. It is learned from 
the American plan. 
Then return to the issue of soft power. Foreign companies are willing to join the plan. Because 
the plan can bring them business opportunities, in this sense, it can improve China’s soft power.  
Besides, for the overseas Chinese companies, besides making money, they have done a lot of 
CSR (corporate social responsibility) in the local areas, for instance, constructing water and 
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electrical appliances in Africa. Also, Huawei has distributed its corporate culture in Europe. 
Except for the executing personnel, Huawei has hired many local people. Also, VIVO, OPPO 
sponsored Indian cricket matches and other sports events. These have specific effects on 
improving China's soft power. 
15. What do you think of the phenomenon of “exchanging technology with the market” for 
foreign-invested companies in China? Besides, how do you think China’s current IP 
protection? 
I don’t think there is a compulsory technology exchange for foreign companies. The exchanges 
occur under the contractual agreements that foreign companies themselves voluntarily reach 
with the Chinese government and enterprises. Companies like Microsoft that I interviewed have 
joint ventures in China, which is the result of voluntary optimism about the opportunities in the 
Chinese market. There is no mandatory. Also, the joint venture company operates according to 
the contract. Foreign companies have technical advantages, and the market is obtained through 
technology output, which represents the law of the market economy.  
For IP protection, I think that in China it is progressing. Although there exist some problems, 
the awareness of protecting is growing stronger. 
 
 
 
